Assisted Reproduction & Parentage

Consultation Paper

March 2018

This consultation paper:

- Describes Saskatchewan’s statutory provisions that determine a child’s legal parentage
- Considers the need for new or amended statutory provisions to determine a child’s legal parentage where the child has been conceived using assisted reproduction
- Outlines legislative reform initiatives addressing assisted reproduction and parentage in Canada and internationally
- Discusses several issues arising from assisted reproduction and determinations of parentage under Saskatchewan's current legislation, and presents options for reform

YOUR COMMENTS AND OPINIONS ARE WELCOME.
The Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan was established by An Act to Establish a Law Reform Commission, proclaimed in force in November 1973, and began functioning in February 1974.

The Commission is incorporated by an Act of the Saskatchewan Legislature. Commissioners are appointed by Order in Council. The Commission’s recommendations are independent and are submitted to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Saskatchewan for consideration.

Projects are initiated by the Commission in response to suggestions from the public and the legal community, or at the request of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General. After preliminary research, the Commission usually issues background or consultation paper to facilitate consultation. Tentative Proposals may be issued if the legal issues involved in a project are complex. Upon completion of a project, the Commission’s recommendations are formally submitted to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General as final proposals.

At present, the Commission is funded by grants from the Law Foundation of Saskatchewan and the Ministry of Justice.

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CALL FOR RESPONSES

The Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan is interested in your response to this consultation paper. Your comments and opinions on the topic are welcome. Please allow the following questions to guide you in your response:

1. What is the significance of an intention to parent the child, a genetic link to the child, and a gestational link to a child when determining the parentage of a child conceived through assisted reproduction?

2. Should there be a limit on the number of legal parents a child can have? If so, why, and what should the limit be?

3. Should the processes and presumptions for assigning parentage to a child conceived through assisted reproduction differ from the processes and presumptions for assigning parentage to a child conceived without assisted reproduction?

How to Respond

Responses may be sent no later than May 31, 2018:

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Responses may also be provided online, via the survey posted on the Commission’s website at: http://lawreformcommission.sk.ca/consultations/.
1. Introduction

Assisted reproduction is used by individuals who want to become single parents, heterosexual couples experiencing fertility issues, and same-sex couples who want to create a family. Assisted reproduction encompasses sperm, ovum, and embryo donation, in vitro fertilization procedures, and the use of surrogates.

Traditionally, parentage has been determined solely based on biology, and until the advent of assisted reproduction, biology was the logical way to determine a child’s parentage. The birth mother of the child was determined to be the child’s legal mother, and the birth mother’s spouse or partner was presumed to be the father of the child and thereby determined to be the legal father of the child.

Apart from a heterosexual couple using their own reproductive material or in vitro fertilization to conceive a child, the use of assisted reproduction introduces another individual - either through the donation of reproductive material or through gestation in the case of a surrogate - into the conception and birth of a child. As a result, the intention to parent becomes a relevant consideration in addition to biology.

Saskatchewan’s parentage legislation largely reflects the historical approach and has not been updated to provide clear rules on who the parents of a child born through assisted reproduction should be. Several jurisdictions in Canada, and internationally, have considered this issue and reformed their legislation accordingly.

This consultation project on how the parentage of children conceived through assisted reproduction should be determined was initiated following requests by a lawyer and an academic residing in Saskatchewan that the Law Reform Commission to study this issue.

Part 2 of this paper provides an introduction to assisted reproduction and legal parent status and discusses Saskatchewan’s current provisions for determining the legal parentage of a child. Part 2 also discusses how Saskatchewan’s current provisions apply to various assisted reproduction scenarios. Part 3 of this paper outlines why reform to address this issue may be necessary and provides an overview of reform efforts in other Canadian jurisdictions, as well as New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Part 4 introduces and discusses a variety of potential areas or topics where reform is needed. Part 5 provides a list of the consultation questions raised in this paper.

This consultation paper focusses solely on parentage issues arising when assisted reproduction is used to conceive a child. It does not deal with or provide any recommendations relating to whether and how the various types of assisted reproduction should or could be used. This paper also does not address a child’s “right to know” their genetic origins.
2. Background

2.1 Assisted Reproduction

Assisted Reproduction Overview

Assisted reproduction includes a variety of procedures used to conceive a child without sexual intercourse. Artificial insemination involves inserting sperm directly into the reproductive organs of a woman and requires donated sperm. *In vitro* fertilization involves fertilizing an ovum outside of a woman’s body, and then implanting the fertilized ovum (embryo) into the woman’s uterus. *In vitro* fertilization can make use of donated sperm, donated sperm and ova, or donated embryos.

A child conceived through assisted reproduction can also be gestated by a surrogate, who will gestate and deliver the child and then the child will be raised by the intended parents. There are two types of surrogacy: traditional and gestational. In a traditional surrogacy, the surrogate’s own ovum is used to create the child. Conception could occur through artificial insemination, *in vitro* fertilization, and potentially through sexual intercourse. In a gestational surrogacy, the surrogate’s reproductive material is not used, and *in vitro* fertilization is used to conceive the child.

The use of assisted reproduction is increasing in Canada. In 2010 there were 11,806 *in vitro* fertilization treatments received in Canada, resulting in 3,188 live births.¹ In 2015, 6,379 babies were born in Canada as a result of *in vitro* fertilization procedures.² In 2016 there were 15,344 cycles of *in vitro* fertilization initiated in Canada, 2801 of which involved donated eggs.³ In 2016 there were 639 babies born to gestational surrogates, an increase from 533 in 2015.⁴ The number of births resulting from artificial insemination cannot be determined, as this procedure does not have to take place in a medical clinic. The same can be said for traditional surrogacies.

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² Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society, Press Release, “Multiple pregnancy rate resulting from IVF at an all-time low of 9.7% in Canada” (November 1, 2017), online: Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society <https://cfas.ca/public-affairs/media/>.
Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction Over Assisted Reproduction

Both the provincial and federal governments have jurisdiction over certain aspects of assisted reproduction, depending on whether each specific aspect falls under either the federal or provincial heads of power as set out in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The federal government, through its jurisdiction over criminal law, exercises jurisdiction over some aspects of assisted reproduction in the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA). The AHRA, enacted in 2004, regulates and prohibits several assisted reproduction related practices, but does not define the parents of a child conceived through assisted reproduction. Section 6 of the AHRA prohibits commercial surrogacy. Section 7 prohibits the purchase or sale of sperm, ova, and embryos.

The provincial government has jurisdiction over aspects of assisted reproduction touching on subject matters under provincial jurisdiction. Provinces have jurisdiction over family law, including determinations of parentage, and Saskatchewan exercises this jurisdiction through The Children’s Law Act, 1997 (CLA, 1997). The provinces also have jurisdiction over whether surrogacy contracts are enforceable, through their jurisdiction over matters of property and civil rights.

The Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan’s mandate is to recommend reform of provincial legislation. This consultation paper is focussed solely on parentage issues arising when assisted reproduction is used to conceive a child.

2.2 Parentage Law Overview

2.2.1 Parental Status

Legal parentage is a lifelong formal status, creating rights and responsibilities for the parent, and affecting the child’s identity and entitlement to a variety of benefits. Wanda Wiegers describes the importance of legal parentage status as follows:

Recognition of the status of a parent provides an opportunity for adults to experience and enjoy a long-lasting relationship with a child. These emotional connections to children are seen as ever more important to adults in a world marked increasingly by conjugal and economic insecurity. The financial implications of parental status are also significant, as parents can be liable for child support in excess of 18 years. For children, of course, their identity is largely shaped by their parentage, which determines their names, relationships, nationality, financial status, and lineage. Parentage, for both parents and children, establishes affective ties, economic and emotional-

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5 The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3.
8 Angela Campbell, “Law’s Suppositions about Surrogacy Against the Backdrop of Social Science” (2012) 43 Ottawa L Rev 29 at 31 [Campbell, “Law’s Suppositions”].
wellbeing, and to a great extent, one’s life path and development. Many of the most meaningful rights, benefits and obligations flow through parentage.9

The Ontario Court of Appeal has identified several rights and responsibilities flowing from a legal declaration of parentage:

- It allows the parent to fully participate in the child’s life;
- The declared parent has to consent to any future adoption;
- The declaration determines lineage;
- The declaration ensures that the child will inherit on intestacy;
- The declared parent may obtain an OHIP card, a social insurance number, airline tickets and passports for the child;
- The child of a Canadian citizen is a Canadian citizen, even if born outside of Canada;
- The declared parent may register the child in school; and
- The declared parent may assert her rights under various laws, such as the Health Care Consent Act, 199610

Legal parentage is assigned at birth and can only be reassigned through an adoption or a court application to obtain a declaration of non-parentage or parentage.

Legal parentage is not the sole way an individual can acquire some of the rights and responsibilities of a parent. Individuals who are not considered to be legal parents can, for instance, apply for custody and access orders in relation to a child. However, the process for obtaining a custody and access order, and the rights that flow from such an order, varies considerably from having legal parentage status:

Unlike custody or access orders, which require an application to the court after the child is born, can be varied by subsequent application, and have no force after the child reaches the age of majority, legal parentage operates presumptively at birth, does not require a court application, cannot be varied, and survives the child reaching the age of majority, thus enabling inheritance. Legal parentage therefore provides significant more long-term stability and security than an order for custody and access.11

In addition, individuals can also be found in certain circumstances to stand in loco parentis - in the place of a parent - to the child.

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2.2.ii Legal Parentage in Saskatchewan

In Saskatchewan, parentage is determined by the *CLA, 1997*, and the information contained in a birth registration is governed by *The Vital Statistics Act, 2009 (VSA, 2009)*. Being listed as a parent on a child’s birth registration creates a presumption of parentage.

The *CLA, 1997* defines mother as “the mother of a child”, including a woman declared to be the mother pursuant to ss. 43 or 44, and a woman recognized as the mother pursuant to ss. 50, 51, 55 or 56. Father is defined as “the father of the child”, including a man declared to be a father pursuant to ss. 43 or 44, and a man recognized as the father pursuant to ss. 50, 51, 55 or 56. Courts in Saskatchewan have interpreted the definitions of mother and father in the *CLA* as referring to a child’s biological mother and father. A parent is defined as “the father or mother of a child” (whether born within or outside the marriage), or the father or mother of a child by adoption.

Both the *CLA, 1997* and the *VSA, 2009* define the birth mother as the mother of the child. This presumption reflects the common law, and until the advent of assisted reproduction, reflected the reality that the birth mother was also the genetic mother of the child. Prior to the advent of genetic testing, however, there was no way to determine the paternity of a child with certainty, and thus the common law developed presumptions of paternity. The presumptions of paternity have been explained as follows:

*The presumption of paternity is not based on societal stereotypes in the ordinary sense. Historically, like other rebuttable presumptions, it made certain assumptions about ordinary human behaviour in circumstances where direct proof was difficult. It assumed that a man and woman cohabiting at a child’s conception or birth were engaging in sexual intercourse from which procreation might inevitably result. The presumption could be discharged upon a preponderance of evidence that the man had not engaged in sexual intercourse with the mother at or around the time of conception, or had no biological connection with the child, or had not assumed a parental relationship with the child. In the days before DNA testing it was simply a method of facilitating proof at a time before science and technology intervened with more reliable standards.*

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13 Sections 50 and 51 of the *CLA, 1997*, supra note 7, provide for the recognition of extraprovincial orders made in and outside of Canada. Sections 55 and 56 address the implications of extraprovincial findings made in and outside of Canada.
14 *WJQM v AMA*, 2011 SKQB 317 at para. 18: “it refers to a child’s biological mother. Such an interpretation is consistent with the ordinary view of parentage which relates to kindred (blood) ties. It is also consistent with the provisions of Part VI of *The Children’s Law Act, 1997* relating to a declaration of parentage with respect to a child’s father for which the Court may order genetic testing. It would be inconsistent to view the biological father as a parent and not the biological mother.”
15 *C(P) v L(S)*, 2005 SKQB 502 at para 20.
Section 45 of the *CLA, 1997* contains the presumptions of paternity. Section 45(1) provides that unless the contrary is proven on a balance of probabilities, there is a presumption that a man is the father of a child in any one of the following circumstances:

(a) at the time of the child's birth or conception the man was cohabiting with the mother, whether or not they were married to each other;
(b) the man and the mother of the child have filed a statutory declaration, acknowledging that the man is the father of the child, with the Registrar of Vital Statistics or an equivalent official in another jurisdiction in Canada;
(c) the man signed the birth registration form pursuant to *The Vital Statistics Act, 2009*, or any former *Vital Statistics Act* or a form of similar effect pursuant to a similar Act in another jurisdiction in Canada;
(d) the man married the mother after the child’s birth and acknowledges that he is the father;
(e) the man and the mother have acknowledged in writing that the man is the father of the child;
(f) the man has been found or recognized by a court in Canada to be the father of the child.

Section 45(3) provides that if there are conflicting presumptions as to the paternity of a child, no presumption is to be made as to paternity, and no person is to be recognized to be the father by virtue of section 45.

Section 43 of the *CLA, 1997* allows a court to make declaratory orders of parentage. Section 43(2) provides that “any person having an interest” may apply for a declaratory order that a man is recognized in law to be the father of the child, or a woman is recognized in law to be the mother of a child. Subsection 43(3) allows a court to find that a woman is or is not in law the mother of a child. Subsection 43(4) allows a court to make a declaratory order of paternity where a presumption of paternity exists pursuant to s. 45 unless it is established on the balance of probabilities that the presumed father is not the father of the child. In addition, where there is no man to which the presumptions of paternity apply, or where there are conflicting presumptions of paternity, or where the presumed father is found not to be the father of the child, s. 43(5) allows the court to make a declaration of paternity if the court finds on the balance of probabilities that a man is the father. Section 44 allows the court to discharge or vary a declaratory order under s. 43 provided certain conditions are met. Clause 45(1)(c) creates a presumption of paternity if a man signs the birth registration. Declarations of parentage under the *CLA, 1997* are not typically obtained if there are no questions or conflicts surrounding parentage.

**Birth Registration**

The *VSA, 2009* ensures that live births of children are registered in accordance with the legislation. Subsection 20(2) places the duty to register the birth on the parents of the child, and if the parents are incapable, a person standing in place of the parents of the child or a person
who has knowledge of the birth of the child must ensure the birth is registered. The statement of live birth must contain the name, date of birth, place of birth, and sex of the child, the mother’s name, date and place of birth, and health services number, the father’s name, date and place of birth, and any additional parent’s name, date and place of birth and sex.\textsuperscript{16}

A birth registration must be completed in order to acquire a birth certificate, which is one of the most fundamental pieces of identification for an individual. The birth certificate will reflect the information on the birth registration, and thus it is of great importance that the birth registration accurately indicates a child’s parentage. Birth certificates create a presumptive proof of parentage.

The VSA, 2009 defines mother as “the woman from whom a child is delivered,” and father as “the person who acknowledges himself to be the biological father of a child.” Unlike the definition of father, there is no explicit genetic link in the definition of mother in the VSA, 2009, as the definition of mother is tied to gestation. In 2009, the term “other parent” was added to the VSA, 2009 and defined as “a person other than the mother or father who is cohabiting with the mother or father of the child in a spousal relationship at the time of the child’s birth and who intends to participate as a parent in the upbringing of the child.”

Section 29 of the VSA, 2009 sets out the circumstances in which amendments can be made to the parentage recorded on the birth registration (other than adoption). Subsection 29(1) requires the registrar to amend the birth registration if a court makes a determination of parentage. In certain circumstances, the registrar may add another parent to the birth registration without a court order, however the registrar is not permitted to remove a parent without a court order.\textsuperscript{17}

### 2.2.iii How is Parentage in Saskatchewan Determined When Assisted Reproduction is Used?

Assisted reproduction can be used in many ways to create a wide variety of families. A heterosexual couple may use sperm, ovum, or embryo donation and have the female partner gestate the child. A heterosexual couple may engage a surrogate to carry a child to term for them, and this child may be genetically related to both intended parents, one of the intended parents, or neither of the intended parents. A female same-sex couple may use a sperm, sperm and ovum, or embryo donor and have one of the partners gestate the child. Same-sex couples may engage surrogates to carry a child that is genetically related to one of the parents (and, in the case of male same-sex couples, it may be unknown to which parent the child is genetically related if their sperm is mixed), or neither of the intended parents. Scientific advances may soon lead to the

\textsuperscript{16} Section 20(3) of the VSA, 2009, supra note 12 and s. 7(1) of The Vital Statistics Regulations, 2010, RRS c V-7.21 Reg 1.

\textsuperscript{17} Section 29(5) of the VSA, 2009, supra note 12.
possibility of same-sex couples being able to combine their genetic material, so that they are both genetically connected to the child. In addition, in some of these scenarios, there may be more than two intended parents.

This section will contemplate how parentage under the *CLA, 1997* could be determined, and how the birth registration would be completed under the provisions of the *VSA, 2009*, in each of these various scenarios.

**Heterosexual Couple Using Gamete Donation**

If a heterosexual couple used a sperm donor, the mother would be listed as the mother on the birth registration. However, the intended father would not be the biological father and would thus not meet the definition of “father” under the *VSA, 2009* (whether this means that the intended father would not be recorded as the father on the birth registration is another issue). The intended father could, however, be listed as an “other parent” on the birth registration.

If a heterosexual couple used a donated embryo, or a donated ovum and sperm, the intended mother would be listed on the birth registration as the child’s mother, as the definition of mother in the *VSA, 2009* is tied to gestation and not to genetics. The intended father would not meet the definition of “father” in the *VSA, 2009* (whether or not this means that the intended father would not be recorded as the father on the birth registration is another issue). The intended father could, however, be listed as an “other parent” on the birth registration.

If a heterosexual couple used an egg donor, and fertilized it with the male partner’s sperm, both intended parents would be identified as the mother and father of the child on the birth registration.

Whether or not the couple would, however, be recognized as parents under the *CLA, 1997* would depend on whether their biological material was used. If the intended parents’ biological material was not used to conceive the child, the *CLA, 1997* leaves open the possibility that the gamete donors could be declared to be the mother and father of the child.

**Heterosexual Couple Using Surrogate**

The *VSA, 2009* defines mother as the birth mother, which results in both a traditional or gestational surrogate being listed on the birth registration as the mother. Whether or not the intended parents can be listed on the birth registration (as the father or other parent), or, if a gestational surrogate was used, be considered as the mother and father under the *CLA, 1997* depends on whether their gametes were used.

If the intended father is the biological father of the child, he could be identified as the “father” on the birth registration and the intended mother could then be identified as an “other parent”
on the birth registration. The intended father would also be considered as the father under the 
CLA, 1997. If the intended mother provided the ovum, then she would be considered as the 
mother under the CLA, 1997, but, as noted above, could not be listed as the mother on the birth 
registration.

If the intended father is not the biological father of the child, then the birth registration is further 
complicated: neither the intended mother (regardless of whether or not her ovum was used) or 
intended father could be listed on the birth certificate as the mother, father, or other parent, as 
an other parent must be in a spousal relationship with the mother or father of the child at the 
time of the child’s birth (note that there is a possibility in these circumstances that the intended 
father would be listed as the father on the birth registration despite not meeting the definition 
of “father” in the VSA, 2009).

Surrogates do not intend to parent the child they have gestated for the intended parents. Despite 
this, surrogates are recorded as the child’s mother on the birth registration. A court application 
is required to declare that a gestational surrogate is not the legal mother of the child and to 
remove the surrogate from being listed as the child’s “mother” on the birth registration. If the 
child was created with the intended mother’s ovum, then the intended mother could also bring 
an application for a declaration that she is the child’s mother, pursuant to s. 43 of the CLA, 1997. 
However, if the intended mother was not the biological mother of the child, she would not be 
considered a parent under the CLA, 1997. The intended mother would have to adopt or seek a 
declaration under s. 43.

If a traditional surrogate was used, the surrogate would be considered the child’s mother under 

**Female Same-Sex Couple Using Gamete Donation**

If a female same-sex couple uses gamete donation, the partner gestating the child would be 
defined as the child’s mother under the VSA, 2009. The birth mother’s partner could be added to 
the birth registration as an “other parent.” The sperm donor could potentially also be included 
on the birth registration as the “father.”

The birth mother’s partner would not be considered a parent under the CLA, 1997 as the 
presumptions of paternity are explicitly limited to males.

The limitation of the presumptions of paternity to males in s. 45(1)(a) of the CLA, 1997 was 
challenged as being contrary to s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in C(P) v 
L(S). The petitioner, argued s. 45(1)(a) was discriminatory because a male cohabiting with a

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18 Supra note 15.
mother is presumed in law to be the father of the child, while a same-sex partner is not entitled to the same presumption. The Court dismissed the application, stating:

The Court cannot aspire to affect the fundamentals of biology that underlie the presumption purely in the interests of equal treatment before the law.

... this application does not bring into question any other aspect of the issue beyond the alleged discriminatory effect of the presumption of paternity arising from cohabitation. It does not challenge the statutory assumption that precludes more than one mother, or more than one father (other than in the case of adoptions), or indeed multiple parents of any description, when making declarations of status and parentage “for all purposes” under The Children’s Law Act, 1997. To the contrary, the petitioner’s application assumes the legislation as it stands does entertain that very concept – an assumption that is flawed having regard to the analysis provided in the relevant Ontario decisions.19

Same-sex Couple Using Gestational Surrogate

If a male same-sex couple used a surrogate to gestate their intended child, the surrogate would be listed as the “mother” on the birth registration form, and if one of the men had contributed their sperm, that individual could be listed as the “father.” In that case, the other intended father could be added as an “other parent.” An application could then be made to the court to remove the surrogate from the birth registration. If the surrogate was a gestational surrogate, she would not be considered the child’s mother under the CLA, 1997, however if the surrogate was a traditional surrogate, she would also be considered the child’s mother under the CLA, 1997.

An application to remove a gestational surrogate from the birth registration in this type of scenario was made in WJQM v AMA.20 Following the birth of the child, the surrogate was listed as the mother on the birth registration, and the intended father whose sperm was used to fertilize the donor egg was listed as the father. The other intended father was listed as the other parent. The petitioners subsequently applied pursuant to s. 43(3) of the CLA, 1997 and/or s. 11 of The Queen’s Bench Act, 199821 for a declaration that the gestational surrogate was not the mother of the child and for an order directing the registrar of vital statistics to amend the registration of live birth by removing the gestational surrogate’s name. The Court issued the declaration, as it was clear that the gestational carrier was not the biological mother of the child and had never intended to assume any parental rights or obligations.22

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19 Ibid. at paras 20 – 24.
20 Supra note 14.
21 The Queen’s Bench Act, 1998, SS 1998, c Q-1.01. Section 11 allows a judge to “make binding declarations of right whether or not any consequential relief is or can be claimed, and no action or matter is open to objection on the ground that a mere declaratory judgment or order is sought,”
22 WJQM v AJA, supra note 14 at para. 25.
If neither of the men contributed sperm to create the child, then neither partner would meet the definition of “father” or “other parent” in the VSA, 2009. However, as noted previously, there is a possibility in these circumstances that one of the intended fathers would be listed as the father on the birth registration despite not meeting the definition of “father” in the VSA, 2009. If this was done, then the other partner could be listed as an “other parent.” If this was not done, then neither man would be listed on the birth certificate.

**Single Woman Using Gamete Donation**
A single woman using donated gametes (in any combination) would be considered the birth mother under the VSA, 2009. She would, however, only be considered the mother of the child under the CLA, 1997 if her own genetic material was used.

**Single Man or Woman Using Gestational Surrogate**
In both cases where a single man or woman uses a surrogate, the surrogate would be considered the birth mother under the VSA, 2009. Neither the single man or woman would be considered an other parent under the VSA, 2009. A court application could be brought to remove the surrogate from the birth registration.

If the child was created using the man’s genetic material, then he could be listed as the father on the birth registration and would also be the child’s father under the CLA, 1997. If the child was not created using the man’s genetic material, then he would not be the child’s father under either statute. If the child was created using the woman’s genetic material, then she would be considered the child’s mother under the CLA, 1997, despite not being listed as the child’s birth mother on the birth registration. If the child was not created using the woman’s genetic material, then she would not be the child’s mother under the CLA, 1997.

The foregoing discussion illustrates the diverse types of families that can be created using assisted reproduction, and the wide range of potential complexities of completing birth registrations and determining parentage under the CLA, 1997 when assisted reproduction is used. While there is great diversity in the types of families that can be created, and the ways these families are created, in all situations where assisted reproduction is used there exists an intention to parent a child; these children are never unplanned. Whether or not this common intention to parent results, however, in the intended parents being recognized on the birth registration or as parents under the CLA, 1997 depends on the interplay between a variety of factors such as the method of assisted reproduction, the source(s) of the genetic material, and the sex of the intended parents.
2.2.iiv Canadian Cases Involving Parentage and Assisted Reproduction

There have been many cases across Canada dealing with issues in determining parentage of children created with assisted reproduction. This section discusses the cases that are most often referred to by academics and courts, and the cases that have led to law reform in other Canadian jurisdictions.

Rutherford v Ontario

In this 2006 decision, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that Ontario’s vital statistics legislation which prevented both mothers from being registered on the child’s statement of live birth discriminated on the basis of sex and sexual orientation, and was thus contrary to s. 15 of the Charter. In reaching its result, the Court made the following observations regarding the impacts of requiring the non-biological co-mother to obtain a declaration of parentage from a court as opposed to allowing them to be included on the child’s birth registration:

Besides threats to their psychological integrity and to feelings of exclusion from a fundamental institution of parentage (or due to not having their parents recognized), the families also pointed to more immediate concrete forms of exclusion. In the case of one applicant recently diagnosed with breast cancer, there was a risk that if her partner had not received a declaration of parentage, that if she died her partner could lose the ability to obtain this right. In cases in which the birth mother dies, becomes incompetent, or has a change of intention, the rights of the lesbian co-mother to recognition as a parent may be threatened.

During the period that a lesbian co-mother is awaiting a declaration of parentage, her ability to act as a parent to her child vis-à-vis the outside world are severely circumscribed. She will not be able to receive documentation on behalf of that child such as a passport, receive medical care for that child, or travel with that child outside Canada. In seeking a CLRA declaration, she will have to make public private family planning decisions.

A(A) v B(B)

In 2007 the Ontario Court of Appeal released its significant decision in the A(A) v B(B) case. A female same-sex couple had conceived a child through artificial insemination using a male friend as a sperm donor, with all three parties agreeing that the women would be the child’s primary caregivers with the male friend being an active participant in the child’s life. The male friend and the birth mother were identified as the child’s parents on the birth certificate. When the child was two years old, the non-birth mother applied for a declaration that she was a parent of the

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23 Rutherford v Ontario (Deputy Registrar Genera), (2006) 81 OR (3d) 81 (ON SCJ).
24 Section 15(1) of the Charter provides as follows:
   Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
26 Supra note 2.
child, in addition to the biological parents. A declaration was sought instead of an adoption as none of the parties wanted the father to forfeit his parental rights.

The application for the declaration was unsuccessful at the lower court, on the basis that the Ontario CLRA allowed individuals having an interest in a child to apply for a declaration that they be recognized in law as “the father” or “the mother” of the child. Although the Court was of the view that making the declaration would be in the child’s best interests, the Court held it was prevented from making a declaration because of the use of the definite article “the” in the relevant provisions of the CLRA, stating:

> The legislator could have left open the possibility of more than one father but, instead, made an express opposite choice. There is no logical reason to suppose the legislator would choose to limit the number of fathers to one while allowing for more than one mother...

> Therefore, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “the” is unambiguous, consistent with other expression of legislative intent and not inconsistent with any Charter or common law principle...

> ...Part II of the Children’s Law Reform Act does not afford authority for the court to grant this application.

The decision was subsequently successfully appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court’s interpretation of the legislation, but allowed the appeal, relying on its parens patriae jurisdiction to issue a declaration that the non-birth mother was also the child’s legal mother. In reaching its decision, the Court stated:

> Present social conditions and attitudes have changed. Advances in our appreciation of the value of other types of relationships and in the science of reproductive technology have created gaps in the CLRA’s legislative scheme. Because of these changes the parents of a child can be two women or two men. They are as much the child’s parents as adopting parents or “natural” parents. The CLRA, however, does not recognize these forms of parenting and thus the children of these relationships are deprived of the equality of status that declarations of parentage provide.

> It is contrary to DD’s best interests that he is deprived of the legal recognition of one of his mothers. There is no other way to fill this deficiency except through the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction. As indicated, AA and CC cannot apply for an adoption order without depriving DD of the parentage of BB, which would not be in DD’s best interests.

The result of the Court of Appeal’s decision is that the child now has three legal parents: two mothers and one father.

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27 AA v BB (2003), 225 DLR (4th) 371 (ON SCJ).
28 Ibid at paras 35-38.
29 AA v BB, supra note 2 at paras 35 and 37.
In this 2011 decision, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench\(^\text{30}\) allowed an application for a declaration of legal parentage made by a man who had entered into an agreement with his same-sex partner and female same-sex couple to conceive two children. One child would be raised by the men, and one would be raised by the women. A child was conceived with the applicant’s partner’s human reproductive material using artificial insemination, and then raised by the applicant and his partner, with the women both having regular access to the child.

The applicant did not adopt the child, and he separated from his partner when the child was three. The child continued to reside with the applicant’s partner, who then entered into a parenting agreement with the child’s birth mother which named both of them guardians of the child. The relationship between the applicant and his former partner and the birth mother deteriorated, and the applicant was denied access to the child. The applicant subsequently brought an application for a declaration of parentage and argued that the parentage provisions in Alberta’s *Family Law Act* discriminated against him on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. At the time of the application, Alberta’s *Family Law Act* allowed the partner of the birth mother in cases of assisted reproduction to be declared the parent of the child, but did not contemplate situations of gay couples as co-parents.

The Court granted the declaration of parentage, holding:

Under the *FLA*, a gay male, regardless of whether he provided sperm for the purposes of the artificial conception, cannot be deemed a parent by operation of law. At the end of the day, the only individuals who can be recognized as parents based upon consent/intent (absent a surrogacy declaration or adoption) are those who are in a spousal relationship with the biological mother. Again, this will never be a gay male. The *FLA* legislates a benefit for individuals in a spousal relationship with the biological mother, which assumes the existence of a heterosexual relationship or (post *Fraess*) a lesbian relationship. By failing to provide a similar benefit for gay males (whether as genetic donor or intended/consensual father) the *FLA* creates a distinction that transcends the mere operation of biology.

The effect of the *FLA* is that when gay males in a committed relationship decide to have a family assisted by a female (in this instance with the assistance of a friend who conceives for them) they should either be satisfied with guardianship status (which they must apply for to receive) or they must undertake the protracted adoption process. Denying a gay father (biological or intended) the status of legal parent has a negative effect on his human dignity...

The ultimate operation of the *FLA* suggests that same-sex couples are somehow less able, or less worthy, of being parents. This reflects outdated assumptions or understandings about family in Canadian society.

\(^{30}\) 2011 ABQB 608, additional reasons 2011 ABQB 791, affirmed 2013 ABCA 240.
At the end of the day, I find that s. 13(2) discriminates against gay males in that it fails to confer a benefit (recognized paternity) and forces gay male parents to endure an extended and protracted legal process in order to have their guardianship and parentage recognized.

Again, while the best interests of the child are of paramount concern, I do not agree that the wording of the legislation proportionately balances these needs against the discriminatory effects created towards homosexuals wishing to raise a family. While s. 13(2) presumes that a male in a heterosexual relationship with a female who conceives through the use of assisted conception should be recognized as a parent by operation of law (whether or not his sperm is actually used in the procedure) it does not make the same presumption about gay parents. Rather, such individuals must proceed through additional court processes to prove their fitness as guardians (through application) or parents (through adoption) and that their relationship with the child will indeed be in the best interest of that child. The damaging effects engendered by the exclusion of same-sex couples using assisted conception from parental status by operation of law are numerous and severe. They reinforce outdated concepts which do not accurately reflect the realities of today’s family in Canada. As such, I find that the impugned legislation does not survive the final stage of the s. 1 analysis.  

This decision was affirmed by the Alberta Court of Appeal.

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31 *Ibid* at paras 84, 90-92. and 115.  
32 2013 ABCA 240.
3. The Case for Reform

3.1 Why is Reform of Saskatchewan’s Parentage Laws Necessary?

There are several reasons why reform of Saskatchewan’s parentage laws may be necessary. As outlined in the previous section, the presumptions of paternity and the presumption that the birth mother is the mother of the child in the CLA, 1997 are arguably neither sufficient nor accurate in cases where assisted reproduction is used to conceive a child. While the VSA, 2009 does allow an “other parent” to be registered on the birth certificate, as discussed above, this category does not necessarily apply to every intended parent. Further, the VSA, 2009 creates only a presumption of parentage; in the event of a dispute, parentage would be determined under the CLA, 1997. Put another way:

Birth registries are administrative tools and are not determinative of legal parentage...Because birth registries do not provide for definitive determinations of parenthood, provincial reform efforts directed at vital statistics legislation are generally an inadequate substitute for reform of legal parentage laws.

The CLA, 1997 does not expressly contemplate same-sex parents or children conceived through the use of assisted reproduction, despite the rising use of assisted reproduction. The use of assisted reproduction thus requires a “re-examination of the basis for assigning legal parentage” in Saskatchewan’s legislation where “greater significance be attached to [the] intention to parent.” Bala & Ashbourne explain the necessity of such a re-examination as follows:

At a time when more and more same-sex couples are choosing to become parents, legislation which continues to rely on ‘old legal assumptions that…parenthood is congruent with birth or the fact that a man is marred to or in a relationship with a birth mother’ remains untenable...

Today, there is an increasing diversity of family forms as well as greater visibility for those such as same-sex partners who may have previously been more secretive about their relationships...There is also a growing acceptance of the legal significance of same-sex partners and the use of ARTs to assist in procreation. However, the law has not yet kept pace with changes in social behaviour and the changing nature of ARTs. Consequently, all jurisdictions in Canada should undertake a review of their legislation governing parentage and children conceived by ARTs.

From the perspective of a child conceived by assisted reproduction, certainty with regards to their legal parentage is clearly in their best interest. As Wanda Wiegers states, “[u]ncertainty or conflict as to parental status at the outset of a child’s life has the potential to critically undermine

34 Ibid at 91.
these benefits [those flowing from parentage] by increasing stress and instability throughout the lives of both caregivers and children.\textsuperscript{36}

The importance to a child conceived through assisted reproduction of having their legal parentage accurately reflect their actual family structure was described in affidavit evidence cited by the Court in the \textit{Rutherford} case:

\begin{quote}
I just want both my moms recognized as my moms. Most of my friends have not had to think about things like this -- they take for granted that their parents are legally recognized as their parents. I would like my family recognized the same way as any other family, not treated differently because both my parents are women.

Most kids understand that I have two moms. But a few kids are mean or just do not understand. They ask who my "real" mom is. I explain that both of my moms are my real moms. Some adults do not understand either. It would help if the government and the law recognized that I have two moms. It would help more people to understand. It would make my life easier. I want my family to be accepted and included, just like everybody else's family.

Imagine winning the case, it would feel amazing. It would feel like we would not have to lie anymore. We would not have to worry about getting in trouble. Nobody could question who my mothers are anymore. I would feel more secure and safer. We could tell the truth. I could just be who I am, and sign my own signature.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

There are also broader equality issues to consider. Assisted reproduction is the only way LGTBQ individuals can conceive a child. Assisted reproduction is also the only way infertile heterosexual couples and single parents can conceive a child. Wanda Wiegers argues:

\begin{quote}
[G]overnments have an obligation to provide certainty and stability for all children and parents, even those children born by way of unconventional arrangements. The present state of the law on assisted conception within and across jurisdictions, however, gives rise to numerous inconsistencies, inequalities and ad hoc outcomes.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

Carol Rogerson suggests that failing to provide children conceived through assisted reproduction “with the same legal certainty of parentage from birth as enjoyed by children born without resort to assisted reproduction can be considered discrimination against children on the basis of their birth certificate or family status.”\textsuperscript{39}

These equality concerns are echoed in the affidavit evidence provided by parents of children conceived through assisted reproduction and cited by the Court in \textit{Rutherford}:

\begin{quote}
One of the most frequently asked questions of lesbian parents who are parenting together, is “who’s the real mom?” In our eyes, the question makes no sense as we are both real moms in the
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{36} Wiegers, supra note 9 at 149.
\textsuperscript{37} Rutherford, supra note 23 at para 216.
\textsuperscript{38} Wiegers, supra note 9 at 222.
\textsuperscript{39} Rogerson, supra note 33 at 97.
\end{flushright}
same way heterosexual couples who have children, or adoptive couples, are both "real" parents. But the question implies a hierarchy based on biology, and once again devalues non-biological parents and deems them "lesser than" biological parents.

We do not want to proceed with an adoption because it feels immoral and dishonest. We are both parents to this child; we were both in attendance at the conception and at the birth. We see no difference between our situation and, for example, a heterosexual couple who have had to use donor sperm to conceive.40

Relying on the court’s parens patriae or general declaratory jurisdiction to make declarations of parentage or non-parentage in individual cases in the absence of clear legislative provisions is not an ideal solution to this issue. This approach does not provide enough certainty to individuals and families contemplating conceiving a child through assisted reproduction, and a lack of certainty regarding a child’s legal parentage may lead to conflict and negatively impact family security. Further, deciding these issues in individual cases may not, in other words, provide parties with “general rules to guide their conduct and shape their expectations,”41 or create consistencies between Canadian jurisdictions.42

Seeking legal recognition for non-biological parents through the doctrine of loco parentis is also arguably insufficient as the relationship is “neither a permanent nor full legal status and rests upon uncertain discretionary judicial determinations. It is also a relationship that is developed over time and that is not attained at the moment of birth.”43 While the doctrine – which allows an individual to be determined to be standing in the place of a parent - may allow a non-biological parent to gain custody or access to the child following a breakdown in the relationship, it is still not the fully recognized status of a legal parent.44

While adoption is a possible route to obtaining legal parenthood for the non-biological intended parent of a child conceived through assisted reproduction in certain circumstances, adoption is a lengthy process, requiring the consent of the child’s legal parents. Angela Campbell suggests that pursuing an adoption is not an “obvious or simple choice” for non-biological parents, given that:

If the only recognized parent is the child’s mother and she supports her partner’s adoption, matters might proceed seamlessly. But if the partnership has dissolved, we can easily imagine the birth mother objecting to her partner’s adoption. Additionally, it there are outstanding issues related to the child’s paternity or if the child has a legally recognized father, consent from the child’s father will be necessary. If this is not acquired, possibilities for the partner’s adoption will be obliterated, given law’s reluctance to recognize more than two parents. A court must also find that the proposed adoption furthers the best interests of the child in question. Finally, even if

40 Rutherford, supra note 23 at paras 215-216
41 Wiegers, supra note 9 at 205.
42 Ibid at 206.
43 Rogerson, supra note 33 at 95.
44 Bala & Ashbourne, supra note 35 at 534.
adoption by a same-sex partner succeeds domestically, there might be problems in attempting to have the filiation validated in other jurisdictions where same-sex marriage and parentage is not recognized. If a lesbian partner does not adopt her spouse’s child, her status as a parent of that child is often precarious.45

Requiring families to engage in litigation to determine their parentage status may also raise access to justice concerns. Bala & Ashbourne have argued:

Parents and children should not be put to the expense of having to litigate to establish recognition of their relationships. Rather, there should be a legal structure that reflects the psychological realities of children’s lives and takes adequate account of the intentions of those individuals who are using ARTs to conceive such children. The availability of appropriate legislative guidance is vitally important for those using ARTs, the children who are conceived in this manner, and the medical and legal professionals who work with these families.46

Finally, as will be discussed below, several provinces have already reformed, to various degrees, their parentage laws to deal with assisted reproduction.

3.2 Reform Efforts Across Canada

British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario have dealt with assisted reproduction and parentage issues in the most comprehensive manner. Other jurisdictions across Canada have dealt with these issues in varying degrees. This section provides a brief overview of each province’s legislative reform efforts; a more detailed discussion of the relevant statutory provisions will be provided in Part 4 of this Consultation Paper. A detailed chart comparing each province’s statutory provisions in relation to assisted reproduction and parentage can also be found in the Appendix.

3.2.i Provincial Reform

British Columbia

British Columbia’s Family Law Act47 (BC FLA) was enacted in 2011 and came into force on March 18, 2013 following years of public consultation. The Act contains separate parentage provisions for determining parentage in cases of adoption, no assisted reproduction, assisted reproduction, assisted reproduction after death, surrogacy, and other arrangements.48 The BC FLA provides that donors are not automatically parents,49 and that when a surrogate is used, the parents of the child are the intended parents at the birth of the child provided certain conditions are met.50

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46 Bala & Ashbourne, supra note 35 at 557.
47 Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 [BC FLA].
48 Ibid at ss. 25 – 31.
49 Ibid at s. 24.
50 Ibid at s. 29.
The transfer of parentage in a surrogacy situation can be dealt with administratively; provided the conditions are met, a court application is not required. These provisions have led some to call BC the most “surrogacy-friendly” province in Canada. The Act also allows for more than two parents in certain circumstances.\(^{51}\)

**Alberta**

Alberta introduced legislation in 2005 to determine parentage for children conceived through assisted reproduction, including surrogacy. In 2010, the legislation was amended to incorporate gender-neutral language, allowing these provisions to apply to same-sex couples. Alberta’s *Family Law Act*\(^{52}\) (*AB FLA*) provides for applications to be made to the court for a declaration that a surrogate is not a parent of the child if the child is born as a result of assisted reproduction.\(^{53}\) The *AB FLA* also provides that gamete donors are not automatically considered to be parents of the child,\(^{54}\) and neither are persons who are married to or in a conjugal relationship with a surrogate at the time of the child’s conception.\(^{55}\) The *AB FLA* does not allow a child to have more than two parents.\(^{56}\)

**Manitoba**

Bill 33, *The Family Law Reform Act* would have substantially reformed Manitoba’s laws surrounding the parentage of children conceived with assisted reproduction. Bill 33 did not, however, advance past second reading following a change in the provincial government in 2016. Bill 33 would have allowed a court to make an order allowing a child to have more than two parents, such an order would be in the best interests of the child. Donors of reproductive material would not be parents by reason only of the donation. Bill 33 also contained a process for obtaining a declaration of parentage where a surrogate was used.

**Ontario**

Ontario recently reformed several pieces of legislation to clarify the parentage of children conceived using assisted reproduction. The amended *Children’s Law Reform Act (ON CLRA)*\(^{57}\) provides that donors of reproductive material, including embryos, are not presumed parents of the child by reason of the donation.\(^{58}\) The birth mother is considered to be a parent of the child,

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\(^{51}\) *Ibid* at s. 30.

\(^{52}\) *Family Law Act, SA 2003, c. F-4.5 [AB FLA]*.

\(^{53}\) *Ibid* at s. 8.2(6).

\(^{54}\) *Ibid* at s. 7(4).

\(^{55}\) *Ibid* at s. 7(5)

\(^{56}\) *Ibid* at s. 8(12).

\(^{57}\) *Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c. C.12 [ON CLRA]*.

\(^{58}\) *Ibid* at s. 5.
except in cases of surrogacy. A birth parent’s spouse is presumed to be a parent where assisted reproduction is used if the spouse did not consent to be a parent of the child prior to conception. The ON CLRA allows for a maximum of four legal parents, and reduces the need to obtain declarations of parentage.

Quebec
Quebec amended its Civil Code in 2002 to create rules for “parental projects,” which begin when intended parents decide to use gamete donation to conceive a child. The spouse of the birth mother is presumed to be the child’s other parent. Gamete donors are not presumed to be parents. Female same-sex parents are addressed in Article 539.1 which provides that “if both parents are women, the rights and obligations assigned by law to the father, insofar as they differ from the mother’s, are assigned to the mother who did not give birth to the child.” The Civil Code does not permit more than two parents. A man may donate sperm either by artificial insemination or sexual intercourse, but if sexual intercourse is used, the man may see a declaration of filiation (parentage) during the first year of the child’s life. Surrogacy agreements are explicitly stated to be null and unenforceable in Article 541.

In 2015, the provincial government established an advisory committee to review several aspects of Quebec’s family law, including Article 541 of the Civil Code. The Advisory Committee on Family Law subsequently produced a lengthy report, containing 82 recommendations for family law reform. The provincial government is not, however, currently moving forward on implementing the recommendations.

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59 Ibid at s. 6.
60 Ibid at s. 8(1).
61 Ibid at s. 10.
62 Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 2002, s. 6 at art 538.3 [Civil Code]. This presumption is rebutted if:
- The child is born more than 300 days after the judgment ordering separation from bed and board of the married spouses, unless they have voluntarily resumed their community of life before the birth; or
- If the child is born within 300 days of the termination of the marriage or civil union, but after a subsequent marriage or civil union of the woman who gave birth of the child.
63 Ibid at art 538.2.
64 Ibid at art 538.2
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid at art 541.
Nova Scotia

Nova Scotia addresses assisted reproduction in its *Birth Registration Regulations*.\(^{69}\) The Regulations were modified in 2007 to respond to issues raised by children conceived through assisted conception, however, “assisted conception” is limited to conception using an anonymous sperm donor.\(^{70}\) The Regulations provide that the spouse of the birth mother of the child conceived through assisted conception must be registered as the child’s other parent.\(^{71}\) If the birth mother is unmarried, the birth mother can acknowledge an individual to be the child’s other parent, and if that person files a statutory declaration acknowledging they intend to assume the role of parent of the child, the birth registration must show that person as the child’s other parent.\(^{72}\) Section 5 of the Regulations deals with surrogacy, and it allows the intended parents to apply to the court for a declaratory order of parentage, provided that one of the intended parents has a genetic link to the child.\(^{73}\)

Newfoundland & Labrador and Yukon

Newfoundland was the first province to address assisted reproduction and parentage. Section 12 of the *Children’s Law Act*,\(^{74}\) enacted in 1988, outlines the presumptions of parentage in cases of artificial insemination. The section is limited to insemination of a man’s female partner by another man’s sperm and provides that the male partner will be considered in law to be the father of the child if he consents in advance to the insemination.\(^{75}\) If, however, the couple is cohabiting but unmarried, the male partner will not be presumed to be the father of the child if it is proved that he refused to consent to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.\(^{76}\) If a married or cohabiting man did not consent to the insemination (or in the case of unmarried partners, also fail to consent to assume the responsibilities of parenthood), he will be considered to be the father of the resulting child if he has demonstrated a settled intention to treat the child as his child, unless it can be proved that he did not know that the child resulted from artificial insemination.\(^{77}\) The Act also provides that a sperm donor who is not married to or cohabiting with the birth mother at the time of insemination is not in law the father of the resulting child.\(^{78}\)

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\(^{69}\) *Birth Registration Regulations*, N.S. Reg. 390/2007.

\(^{70}\) *Ibid* at s. 2(b).

\(^{71}\) *Ibid* at s. 3(1).

\(^{72}\) *Ibid* at s. 3(2).

\(^{73}\) *Ibid* at s. 5(2)(e).


\(^{75}\) *Ibid* at ss. 12(3) and (4).

\(^{76}\) *Ibid* at s. 12(4).

\(^{77}\) *Ibid* at s. 12(5).

\(^{78}\) *Ibid* at s. 12(6).
The Yukon Territory enacted an identical provision in 2002 in its *Children’s Law Act*.79

**Prince Edward Island**

Prince Edward Island’s *Child Status Act*80 was amended in 2008 to address presumptions of parentage where “assisted conception” has been used. “Assisted conception” is defined as conception by a means other than sexual intercourse, and includes *in vitro* fertilization using the mother’s ovum.81 Subsection 9(5) uses gender-neutral language, providing that a person is presumed to be the parent of a child if at the time of insemination they were the spouse of, or cohabiting in a conjugal relationship with, the mother, unless the person did not consent in advance to the assisted conception and did not demonstrate a settled intention to treat the child as their own, or the person did not know that the child was born by assisted conception. The Act also states that gamete donors are not by that reason alone a parent of the child.82 Birth mothers are deemed to be the mother of the child, and there can be no more than two parents.83 The amendments do not address surrogacy.

**Northwest Territories**

The *Children’s Law Act*84 was amended in 2011 based on the Uniform Law Conference of Canada’s *Uniform Child Status Act*. The Act allows any interested person to apply to the court for a declaratory order that they are or are not to be recognized in law as a parent of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction.85 Gamete and embryo donors are not presumed to be parents, and cannot be declared to be parents, by reason only of the donation.86 Section 8.1 sets out the presumptions of parentage where assisted reproduction is used. A person is a parent of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction if he or she was married to or cohabiting with the birth mother at the time of conception and consented to be a parent of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction.87 This presumption of parentage does not apply if the birth mother is a surrogate.88 The Act does not contain any surrogacy specific parentage provisions.

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80 *Child Status Act*, RSPEI 1988, c C-6 at s. 9 [PEI CSA].
81 *Ibid* at s. 9(2).
82 *Ibid* at s. 9(6).
83 *Ibid* at ss. 9(7) – (8).
85 *Ibid* at s. 5.1(1).
86 *Ibid* at s. 5.1(3). Section 5.1(4) clarifies that s. 5.1(3) does not apply in respect of a person who provides his or her own human reproductive material or an embryo created with his or her own human reproductive material for use in assisted reproduction for his or her own reproductive use.
87 *Ibid* at s. 8.1(1). Section 8(2) provides that a person is presumed to have consented to be a parent of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction if, at the time of conception, the person was married to the birth mother or was cohabiting with the birth mother in a relationship of some permanence.
88 *Ibid* at s. 8.1(3).
3.2.ii Uniform Law Conference of Canada

In 2010, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) approved the *Uniform Child Status Act* (*Uniform Act*)[^99] and recommended its adoption to all jurisdictions in Canada. The purpose of the Act is to modernize and replace the former *Uniform Child Status Act* (1992) in order to provide basic rules for determining the parentage of all children. The Act provides rules for determining the parentage of all children, including those born through assisted reproduction. The Act provides that donors are not parents by virtue of their donation, allows for more than two legal parents, and sets out a process to determine parentage in cases of surrogacies. This process only applies if at least one of the intended parents has a genetic connection to the child.

3.3 Reform Efforts Outside Canada

3.3.i New Zealand

New Zealand prohibits commercial surrogacy[^90] but allows altruistic surrogacy. Altruistic surrogacies must, however, be approved by the National Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology. The Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology has created guidelines for approval, including requirements that: at least one of the intended parents have a genetic link to the child; the mother must not be able to undertake pregnancy due to a medical reason; each party has received medical advice, independent legal advice and counselling; and the parties have discussed the ongoing contact and care of the child.[^91]

Parentage of children is determined by the *Status of Children Act 1969*.[^92] Part 2 of this Act, added in 2005, sets out the rules for determining the status of children conceived as a result of assisted reproduction. The partner of the birth mother is presumed to be the legal parent of a child born through assisted reproduction.[^93] Donors are not presumed to be legal parents, unless they become the birth mother’s partner after the conception.[^94]

The *Status of Children Act 1969* does not contain any provisions allowing parentage to be transferred from the surrogate to the intended parents; the intended parents are required to

[^90]: Commercial surrogacy is prohibited in the *Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004* (NZ) 2004/92.
[^93]: *Ibid* at s. 18(2).
adopt the child after it is born, or apply for a guardianship order, even if the intended parents are the genetic parents of the child.

The Law Commission of New Zealand released its *New Issues in Legal Parenthood Report* in 2005. The Commission made several recommendations, including that adoption not be required for surrogacies where the child is the genetic child of one or both intending parents. In these cases, the Commission recommended that the court be able to transfer parental status provided certain conditions are met. The Commission also recommended that a court process be created to resolve disputes and determine parentage, guardianship and care of the child in the event the surrogate mother changes her mind.

### 3.3.ii Australia

Similar to Canada, legislation dealing with assisted reproduction and parentage varies between the Australian states and territories. However, five of the jurisdictions have statutory provisions deeming the birth mother’s same-sex partner to be a parent of the child conceived using assisted reproduction, and providing that a donor is not presumed to be a parent by reason only of the donation.

Australia is also similar to Canada in that commercial surrogacy is prohibited, and altruistic surrogacy is permitted in all jurisdictions. However, several jurisdictions have placed restrictions or conditions on the practice of altruistic surrogacy. Some jurisdictions require there to be a genetic connection between at least one of the intended parents and the child. The process for determining parental status in cases of surrogacy remains complex; as summarized by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission, “[m]ost states have rules about who qualifies as an intended parent or surrogate mother, and some require the involvement of lawyers or mandatory counselling. In Western Australia and Victoria, a statutory agency must give approval for the process before conception.”

The Victorian Law Reform Commission published its final report on Assisted Reproductive Technology & Adoption, containing 202 recommendations, in 2007. In 2008, the *Assisted

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96 *Ibid* at xix-xx.
97 Manitoba Report *supra* note 1 at 20.
98 *Ibid*.
Reproductive Treatment Act\textsuperscript{102} was passed, implementing most of the Commission’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{103}

### 3.3.iii United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) enacted legislation dealing with surrogacy in 1985. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985\textsuperscript{104} prohibits commercial surrogacies,\textsuperscript{105} and provides that surrogacy agreements are not enforceable.\textsuperscript{106} In 1994, regulations made under this legislation allowed married couples to apply for parentage orders for children born to a surrogate. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008\textsuperscript{107} sets out the rules for determining parentage of children conceived with assisted reproduction.

For heterosexual couples using artificial insemination, the male partner is presumed to be a legal parent of the child unless it can be shown that the husband did not consent.\textsuperscript{108} If the couple is unmarried, the partner is the legal father if conception took place at a licensed clinic and both parties signed consent forms electing the male partner to be treated as a parent.\textsuperscript{109} The same rules apply for female same-sex partners either in a civil partnership or not in a civil partnership.\textsuperscript{110} For male same-sex partners, the biological father and the birth mother are the legal parents of the child. If the partners are in a civil partnership, the non-biological father, and the biological father and birth mother may sign a parental responsibility agreement to give responsibility to the non-biological father, allowing him to make parental decisions, but not conferring the full legal status of a parent.

In regards to surrogacy, the surrogate is named as the mother on the birth certificate, and the intended parents must apply for a court order to be recognized as legal parents.\textsuperscript{111} The surrogate mother and her partner must consent to the court order.\textsuperscript{112} The child must also have been created with the gametes of at least one of the intended parents.\textsuperscript{113} Parental order reports (PORs) are prepared by social workers for consideration by the court when making the requested

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\textsuperscript{102} Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic).


\textsuperscript{104} Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (UK) c 49.

\textsuperscript{105} ibid at s. 2.

\textsuperscript{106} ibid at s. 1A.

\textsuperscript{107} Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK) c 22. The legislation was enacted in 1990 and updated and revised in 2008.

\textsuperscript{108} ibid at s. 35.

\textsuperscript{109} ibid at s. 36.

\textsuperscript{110} ibid at ss. 42 and 43.

\textsuperscript{111} ibid at s. 54.

\textsuperscript{112} ibid.

\textsuperscript{113} ibid.
The social workers investigate the surrogacy arrangement and the best interests of the child. Karen Busby notes that these processes are:

\[ \text{E}xpensive, \text{t}ime \text{c}onsuming \text{a}nd \text{i}nvasive. \text{R}arely, \text{if} \text{e}ver, \text{a}re \text{p}arental \text{o}rders, \text{d}enied, \text{a}nd \text{r}e\text{se}arch \text{d}emonstrates \text{t}hat \text{t}he \text{P}ORs \text{t}hemselves \text{a}re \text{n}ot \text{s}ure \text{w}hat \text{t}hey \text{a}re \text{a}ssessing \text{a}nd \text{t}hey \text{w}onder \text{a}bout \text{t}he \text{e}fficacy \text{t}he \text{i}n\text{q}uiries. \text{M}ore\text{o}ver, \text{a}s \text{t}he \text{p}aramount \text{c}onsideration \text{s}ince \text{2}010 \text{i}s \text{t}he \text{c}hild\text{’}s \text{w}elfare, \text{o}ne \text{w}onders \text{w}hether \text{t}he \text{e}laborate \text{P}OR \text{i}n\text{q}uiries \text{in} \text{B}ritain \text{a}re \text{s}t\text{i}ll \text{n}ecessary. \]

3.3.iv Uniform Law Commission (US)

There is a significant amount of variation between the states regarding assisted reproduction and parentage determinations, and as to whether commercial surrogacy and traditional surrogacies are permitted.

The Uniform Law Commission revised and updated the Uniform Parentage Act in 2017 (UPA, 2017). The UPA, 2017 updated the surrogacy provisions in Article 8 of the UPA, 2002 (which had been enacted in only two states) and includes a new Article 9 dealing with the right of children born using assisted reproduction to access medical and identifying information regarding gamete donors. Article 8 permits both traditional and gestational surrogacy arrangements but regulates them differently. Traditional surrogates are entitled to withdraw their consent up until 72 hours after birth. Article 9 requires the disclosure of non-identifying medical history information from the donor. It does not require the disclosure of the identity of a gamete donor, but it requires gamete banks and fertility clinic to ask the donor whether their identifying information should be disclosed to the child when they turn 18. The UPA, 2017 also provides that donors are not parents.

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115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
4. Potential Areas for Reform

This section begins with a discussion of the principles that may be relevant when considering how assisted reproduction should be incorporated into Saskatchewan’s parentage laws. It then discusses several issues that arise from the use of assisted reproduction, considers how various jurisdictions have addressed those issues, and raises consultation questions on each issue.

4.1 Guiding Principles for Reform

There are many guiding principles that may be relevant to the Commission’s eventual recommendations regarding the rules of, and processes for, assigning parentage of children born through assisted reproduction.

The Manitoba Law Reform Commission suggests that the following principles are relevant to the reform of parentage laws to address assisted conception:

- The law respecting legal parentage and birth registration must comply with the Charter and ensure equality of treatment for persons using assisted reproduction and their children;
- Children should have equal status in law and the same legal protections regardless of the circumstances of their conception or the status of their parents;
- Children and their parents benefit from clarity and certainty of status at the earliest reasonable time. Accordingly, out-of-court processes should be preferred for establishing parentage whenever possible;
- Markers of legal parentage generally include biology, gestation and the intent to parent the child formed before conception. With respect to children born as a result of assisted reproduction, the intent to parent the child before conception is a principal marker;
- The child’s best interests are a paramount consideration in all decisions concerning parentage.118

The New Zealand Law Commission adopted five guiding principles in arriving at its recommendations in its New Issues in Legal Parenthood report:

1. The child’s welfare and best interests;
2. The desirability of clarity and certainty at the earliest possible time in the child’s life and of simple procedures to achieve this;
3. The need for individuals to access information about their genetic and gestational parentage;
4. The desirability of autonomy and collaboration in parenting; and
5. The equality of children regardless of the circumstances of their creation or family form.119

The principles guiding the provincial government in British Columbia as it reformed its family law legislation were stated to be:

118 Manitoba Report, supra note 1 at 23.
119 New Zealand Report, supra note 95 at xvii.
• Promoting family stability;
• Providing certainty of parental status as soon as possible;
• Treating children fairly, regardless of the circumstances of their birth;
• Protecting vulnerable persons; and
• Preferring out-of-court processes where possible.  

Wanda Wiegers suggests there should be three norms guiding legislative reform in this area: equality of family status, security of the family, and preventing discrimination against the LGBTQ community by taking account considerations of equality in terms of both gender and sexual orientation.  

Wiegers suggests that parentage should not be determined by considering the children’s interests in isolation from their parent’s interests as the “expectation and reliance interests of intending parents are in fact relevant to children’s best interests because they directly affect their experience of familial stability” and it is well established “that conflict between parents and added stress in their lives is generally harmful for children.” Therefore, Wiegers asserts that “[r]ules that can provide guidance for the secure recognition of parentage at and from a child’s birth and the avoidance of ongoing conflict in their lives will generally be in the best interests of both caregivers and children.”

Consultation Questions

1. What guiding principles should the Commission consider when making its recommendations?

2. Should any guiding principle be of higher importance than the others?

4.2 Assisted Reproduction - Gamete & Embryo Donation

Gamete and embryo donation can be used by heterosexual couples, same-sex couples, and women intending to be single parents. In each of these cases, the birth mother, who may or may not be related to the child, intends on being a parent to the child. Assisted reproduction involving ovum or embryo donation always require the services of a medical clinic, whereas assisted

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121 Wiegers, supra note 9 at 171.
122 Ibid at 170.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
reproduction involving sperm donation may or may not require the services of a medical clinic and may or may not involve sexual intercourse.

This section discusses the presumptions of parentage that should apply where gametes and embryos are donated, the parental status of donors, and whether the presumptions of parentage and parental status of donors should differ where sperm donation occurs through sexual intercourse. Gamete and embryo donation can also be used in surrogacies, however this section is limited to situations where the birth mother is also the intended parent of the child. The use of surrogates will be discussed in section 4.3 of this paper.

4.2.i Presumptions of Parentage

In each jurisdiction that has addressed this issue, the birth mother is a parent of the child, whether or not her own reproductive material was used. There is, however, a slight amount of variation as to how the presumptions of parentage operate with respect to the partner of the birth mother.

The **CLA, 1997** does not explicitly address the legal parentage of the non-genetically related parent in a same-sex partnership. The jurisdictions in Canada that have addressed this issue now provide that the birth mother’s partner is presumed to be a parent of a child conceived through assisted reproduction provided they consented. Individuals who become partners of the birth mother after conception and who wish to become legal parents of the child would have to adopt the child.

In Alberta, the presumptions of parentage in various cases of assisted reproduction are set out in s. 8.1 of the **FLA**. The partner (the spouse or a person in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence) of the birth mother is deemed to be the parent of the child if they consented to be a parent of the child at the time of conception. Subsection 8.1(6) states that the person’s consent is presumed unless the contrary is proven.

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125 BC FLA, supra note 47 at s. 27(2); AB FLA, supra note 52 at s. 8.1; ON CLRA, supra note 57 at s. 6(1); Quebec Civil Code, supra note 62 at art 538.1; Uniform Act, supra note 89 at s. 3(2).

126 Section 8.1(2) of the **AB FLA**, supra note 52 applies if the reproductive material of a male person was used – the parents are deemed to be the birth mother and the male person, unless the birth mother is a surrogate. Section 8.1(3) applies if the reproductive material of a female person (including an embryo) was used – the parents are deemed to be the birth mother and the person who was married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence with the birth mother at the time of conception and who consented to be a parent of the child. Section 8.1(4) applies if the reproductive material or an embryo from both a male and female person is used – the parents are deemed to be the birth mother and the male person. Section 8.1(5) applies if neither the female or male person provided the human reproductive material – the parents are the birth mother and the person who was married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with the birth mother at the time of conception and who consented to be a parent of the child.
In British Columbia, the partner (a person who was married to, or in a marriage-like relationship with the child’s birth mother) of the birth mother at the time of conception is presumed to be the legal parent of a child conceived through assisted reproduction, unless there is proof that the person did not consent to be a parent, or withdrew their consent.\textsuperscript{127}

In Ontario, the “spouse” (the person to whom a person is married or living in a conjugal relationship) of the birth parent at the time of conception is a parent of the child, unless the spouse did not consent to be a parent to the child or withdrew the consent.\textsuperscript{128}

In Quebec, the spouse (married or civil union) of the birth mother is presumed to be the child’s other parent in cases of assisted procreation if the child is born during the marriage or civil union or within 300 days after its dissolution or annulment.\textsuperscript{129}

The \textit{Uniform Act} contains the following presumption of parentage provision:

5(1) A person is presumed to be and is recognized in law to be a parent of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction, if the person

\begin{itemize}
\item[a)] Was married to or in a common-law partnership with the birth mother at the time of the child’s conception, and
\item[b)] Consented to be a parent of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction and did not withdraw that consent prior to the child’s conception.
\end{itemize}

(2) Unless the contrary is proven, a person is presumed to have a consented to be a parent of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction if the person was married to the birth mother or was in a common-law partnership with the birth mother at the time of the child’s conception.

(3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), a person who was married to or in a common-law partnership with a surrogate at the time of the child’s conception is not presumed to be nor is recognized in law to be a parent of the child born as a result of assisted reproduction.

Under these provisions, a partner of the birth mother who was not a partner at the time of conception but wishes to become a legal parent of the child would need to adopt the child.
**Consultation Question**

3. What presumptions of parentage should apply in cases of assisted reproduction using gamete and embryo donation?

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**4.2.ii Parental Status of Donors**

The *CLA, 1997* does not clarify the rights and responsibilities of gamete donors. The potential to be declared a legal parent under the *CLA, 1997* may limit the number of individuals willing to act as known gamete donors, given that most donors are interested in helping others to become parents as opposed to becoming parents themselves.

The *AB FLA* provides that gamete donors are not automatically considered to be parents of the child.130 The *BC FLA* and the *Uniform Act* provide the same.131 Ontario’s *CLRO* similarly provides that a “person who provides reproductive material or an embryo for use in the conception of a child through assisted reproduction is not, and shall not be recognized in law to be, a parent of the child unless he or she is a parent of the child under this Part.”132 Article 538.2 of Quebec’s Civil Code states that the “contribution of genetic material to the parental project of another cannot be the basis for any bond of filiation between the contributor and the child consequently born.”

Provisions stating that donors are not parents by virtue only of their donation do not preclude a donor from becoming a legal parent. As explained by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission:

> [T]here may still be a possibility for the donor to be a legal parent if that is consistent with the parties’ intentions. This provision also would not prevent a court from finding that a donor who is not a legal parent has developed a parent-like relationship with a child for the purposes of custody, access or support. It would, however, provide certainty to donors and prospective parents that an uninvolved donor is not a legal parent merely because a genetic relationship exists.133

The Manitoba Law Reform Commission has recommended that legislation should provide that: (1) donors are not, by reason only of the donation, a parent of a child born as a result, and (2) donors may not be declared to be a parent of the child by reason only of the donation.134

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130 *Ibid* at s. 7(4).
131 *BC FLA*, *supra* note 47 at s. 24, *Uniform Act*, *supra* note 89 at s. 6(6).
132 *ON CLRA, supra* note 57 at s. 5.
133 Manitoba Report, *supra* note 1 at 24-25.
134 *Ibid* at 25.
The New Zealand Law Commission recommended a more nuanced approach to this issue in their 2005 report, recommending that there be a mechanism for a known donor to be recognized as a legal parent in certain circumstances. In the Commission’s view:

There are no apparent policy reasons why a child and family should lose the advantage of having a legal father, where the genetic father wishes and intends to act as a father from birth, simply because of the method of conception. The child will lack the legal rights he or she would otherwise obtain from his or her father such as citizenship or inheritance. Similarly, a genetic father who intends and wishes to take on all the rights and responsibilities of parenthood should not lose that legal relationships with his child purely because of the method of conception.\(^\text{135}\)

The Commission recommended there be a simple scheme in the legislation enabling donors to opt into parenthood with the consent of the birth mother, or the birth mother and her partner.\(^\text{136}\) The Commission recommended there be different requirements, however, depending on whether the sperm donor is going to be the child’s second or third legal parent, in recognition of the different type of relationship that may exist between the donor and the birth mother in each case and the increased likelihood of conflict where the donor will be the child’s third legal parent.\(^\text{137}\)

Where the donor will be the child’s second parent and the donor intends to raise the child jointly with the birth mother, the Commission recommended a two-stage process. The first stage would require the woman and the sperm donor (prior to birth) to present a form and sworn statements to a registrar of the Family Court. The woman’s sworn statement would state that the donor will be a genetic parent and that she wants him to be a legal parent. The donor’s sworn statement would provide that he will be a genetic parent and wants to be a legal parent. The registrar would give interim approval. After birth, the registrar would approve the application after being given proof that the donor is the genetic parent of the child.\(^\text{138}\)

Where the donor will be the child’s third parent, a two-stage process would also be created. At the initial pre-birth stage, the donor and intended parents would provide sworn statements to the registrar of Family Court confirming their intentions. Evidence would also have to be provided that all three parties have received independent legal advice and counselling about the potential issues raised by their planned family, and to have entered into a written agreement setting out each party’s role in parenting, and contact with, the child. The registrar would give interim approval, and after the birth would approve the application upon proof of the donor’s genetic parentage of the child.\(^\text{139}\)

\(^\text{135}\) New Zealand Report, *supra* note 95 at 65.
\(^\text{137}\) *Ibid* at 67.
\(^\text{139}\) *Ibid.*
The Victorian Law Reform Commission considered allowing donors to opt into legal parent status, and recommended against such a process, stating:

We agree with suggestions made in submissions and other consultations that Family Court parenting orders are a more flexible and appropriate way to recognize a donor’s significant role in a child’s life. Parenting orders can be adapted to the particular circumstance of each case, and can be adjusted to reflect the evolution of the relationship between the donor and the child as the child matures. Many people, such as grandparents and aunts, make valuable contributions to children’s upbringing and are responsible for significant levels of care, without being legally recognized as parents.  

Consultation Questions

4. Should the Act state that gamete and embryo donors are not parents solely on the basis of their donation?

5. Should the Act allow donors to opt into legal parenthood if certain conditions are met? If so, what conditions?

4.2.iii “Involved Known Donor” Status

Some commentators have suggested an intermediate type of parental status - an “involved known donor” - be created for gamete donors wishing to be involved to some degree in the child’s life. Fiona Kelly has suggested that any person should be able to apply to the court, within one year of the child’s birth, to opt into the status of “non-parental adult caregiver” if both legal parents consent.

Allowing a gamete donor to be an “involved known donor” serves two purposes. First, it allows a gamete donor to have some of the rights and responsibilities of a parent, without being considered the child’s legal parent and thereby having the full range of rights and responsibilities attached to that status. Second, it provides security to single parents by choice and to same-sex couples that allowing their child’s known donor to play a role in their child’s life will not result in the future elevation of the donor to full legal parent status in the event of a dispute regarding the child’s parentage. Fiona Kelly suggests:

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140 Victorian Report, supra note 101 at 138.
Extending some form of legal recognition to involved known donors protects the donor’s interests in maintaining an access relationship with the child, while also protecting the lesbian family, particularly the non-biological mother. When the “involved known donor” and non-biological mother need no longer compete for the status of second legal parent the likelihood, as well as the intensity, of a dispute may be lessened.\(^{142}\)

New Zealand’s *Care of Children Act, 2004*\(^{143}\) allows a known donor to opt into this type of role with the consent of the child’s presumptive parents. Clause 41(1)(a) allows a party to an agreement between the parents of a child and the gamete donor(s) relating to contact with the child and/or their role in the child’s life to have the agreement embodied in a court order. The section makes clear that the agreement itself cannot be enforced under the Act, but, if all parties consent, the court can make an order embodying all or some of the terms of the agreement.\(^{144}\) The contact related provisions of the court order can then be enforced as if it were a parenting order relating to contact.\(^{145}\) If the parties have a dispute relating to the role of the donor(s) in the upbringing of the child as set out in the court order embodying the terms of the agreement, any party may apply to the court for its direction and the court may make any order relating to the matter.\(^{146}\)

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**Consultation Questions**

6. *Should there be an intermediate status for “involved known donors” to ensure that donors that play a role in the child’s life are not subsequently treated as parents by the courts? What rights and responsibilities should attach to that status?*

7. *If so, under what circumstances should a donor be able to obtain this status?*

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4.2.iv Sperm Donation via Sexual Intercourse

Sperm donation via sexual intercourse is a reasonably common occurrence for women desiring to be single mothers, and it is also occasionally used by female same-sex couples.\(^{147}\) However, most Canadian jurisdictions limit their assisted reproduction parentage provisions to assisted reproduction by artificial insemination; in other words, sperm donation via sexual intercourse is

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\(^{143}\) *Care of Children Act 2004* (NZ) 2004/90.

\(^{144}\) *Ibid* at s. 41(3).

\(^{145}\) *Ibid* at s. 41(4).

\(^{146}\) *Ibid* at ss. 41(5)-(6).

\(^{147}\) Kelly, “Equal Parents, Equal Children”, *supra* note 142 at 274.
not considered to be assisted reproduction. The reason for this is presumably a recognition of
the fact that in the vast majority of cases, children conceived through sexual intercourse are not
intended to be conceived via sperm donation, and to prevent claims by one parent that either
they are not - or their ex-partner is not - actually a legal parent of the child in the event of a
breakdown of the relationship.

Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario each define “assisted reproduction” as a method of
conceiving other than by sexual intercourse.\(^{148}\) The Uniform Act defines assisted reproduction
similarly,\(^{149}\) as does the UPA (2017).\(^{150}\) Nova Scotia’s Birth Registration Regulations defines
“assisted conception” as “conception that occurs as a result of artificial reproductive technology
using an anonymous sperm donor” which rules out sperm donation via sexual intercourse. In
these jurisdictions, the assisted reproduction parentage provisions do not apply to sperm
donation via sexual intercourse, and, excepting Ontario, the non-assisted reproduction
parentage provisions would apply.

Ontario has recently enacted a provision allowing sperm donation to occur via sexual intercourse
if the intended birth parent and the sperm donor enter into a pre-conception written agreement
that the sperm donor does not intend to be a parent of the child.\(^{151}\) If a pre-conception written
agreement is in place, the sperm donor is not, and shall not be recognized to be, a parent of the
child.\(^{152}\)

Quebec also differs to some degree on this issue. The Code provides that sperm donation for a
parental project may take place via sexual intercourse. Sperm donation via sexual intercourse is
not, however, treated the same as sperm donation via assisted reproduction. In cases of sperm
donation via sexual intercourse, the donor has the opportunity to establish filiation (parentage)
within the first year of the child’s life, whereas in cases of sperm donation via artificial
insemination, the donor is not able to claim filiation.

Fiona Kelly suggests that since sperm donation via sexual intercourse is reasonably common,
assisted conception should include conception via intercourse, and legislation should encourage
pre-conception written agreements.\(^{153}\) She also suggests that legislation should also make clear
that “where a pre-conception agreement exists, conception via intercourse does not negate the
intention of the lesbian couple or single woman to parent independently of the donor.”\(^{154}\)
Barbara Findlay & Zara Suleman have also suggested that “it is completely inconsistent with past

\(^{148}\) AB FLA, supra note 52 at s. 5.1(1)(a); BC FLA, supra note 47 at s. 20(1); ON CLRA, supra note 57 at s. 1(1).
\(^{149}\) Uniform Act, supra note 89 at s. 1.
\(^{150}\) Section 701 of the UPA (2017), supra note xx provides that Article 7 [assisted reproduction] does not apply to the
birth of a child conceived by sexual intercourse.
\(^{151}\) ON CLRA, supra note 57 at s. 7(4).
\(^{152}\) Ibid at s. 7(5).
\(^{153}\) Kelly “Equal Parents, Equal Children” supra note 142 at 275.
\(^{154}\) Ibid at 276.
practice, and it defies logic, that a child’s rights, and the rights of her prospective parents, depend on whether the man donating sperm donated it into a vial, or directly to the woman.”¹⁵⁵

On the other hand, Wanda Wiegers suggests that there may be good reason to distinguish between conception via sexual intercourse and conception via artificial insemination:

[T]he “mechanics of conception” may be highly relevant to “relational realities.” Holding men responsible in instances of casual sex, may, at least in theory, promote an equal sense of responsibility for the potential consequences of sexual intercourse. By contrast, assisted conception is typically highly planned and deliberate, especially when executed in a clinical setting, and usually indicative of a very high level of responsibility on the part of both donors and intended parents.¹⁵⁶

It is possible that allowing sperm donation via sexual intercourse if certain requirements are met may result in an increasing number of disputes over the parentage of a child conceived through sexual intercourse. In a recent interesting decision from Ontario,¹⁵⁷ a Court issued a declaration of non-parentage in a case where a child was conceived through sexual intercourse, and the existence of a verbal sperm donor agreement was disputed between the parties. The Court held that the provisions of the CLRA allowing sperm donation to occur via sexual intercourse were not applicable as the parties had not entered into a pre-conception written agreement. However, the Court relied on the general declaratory power in s. 13 of the amended CLRA to declare that someone is or is not a parent, and issued a declaration that the male was not a parent of the child. The Court found that on the balance of probabilities, the parties had a pre-conception agreement that the male would act as a sperm donor and would not be a father to the child. In arriving at its decision, the Court stated:

[162] The amendments to the CLRA with respect to parentage move the focus away from biology toward the pre-conception intentions of the parties. The legislature, in enacting the amendments to the CLRA, has signalled its support for parties to determine a child’s family unit regardless of the gender of the parents and, with some limitations, regardless of the number of parents. A family intentionally comprised of one parent is no less a child’s family than one comprised of two or more parents.

[163] The legislation sets out a framework wherein, if followed, prospective parents can ensure that when the child is born they will be entitled to legal recognition of their parental status or non-status without costly and possibly public legal processes. However, as history tells us, the legislation cannot anticipate every parenting arrangement and not every parenting arrangement will meet the statutory presumptions. In those cases, like this one, parties seeking declaratory relief with respect to parentage must resort to s. 13 of the amended CLRA.

[164] This case should not stand for the proposition that parties are not required to reduce their agreements to writing. Rather the facts in this case highlight how crucial it is for parties to have

¹⁵⁶ Wiegers, supra note 9 at 189-190.
¹⁵⁷ MRR v JM, 2017 ONSC 2655.
a written agreement clearly defining their intentions before a child is conceived. Decisions as to whether or not to be a parent to a child are far better reached in a dispassionate setting rather than in the emotional place following the conception and birth of the child.

Consultation Questions

8. Should the assisted reproduction parentage provisions apply to situations of assisted reproduction using sperm donation through sexual intercourse? Why or why not?

9. If so, should a pre-conception agreement be required in order for a sperm donor to not be determined to be a legal parent where sperm donation has occurred via sexual intercourse? Are there any other conditions that should be imposed on this arrangement?

4.3 Assisted Reproduction - Surrogacy

Surrogacy presents a unique type of assisted reproduction where the birth mother of the child does not intend to be the legal mother of the child. Hetero-sexual couples, same-sex couples, and men and women who intend to parent as single parents may all use surrogates. The genetic contribution of the intended parents may vary. In addition, the genetic contribution of the birth mother differs between a gestational surrogate (no genetic contribution) and a traditional surrogate (contributes the ovum). Surrogates may be single, or be married or cohabiting with a partner. Gestational surrogacy will always involve a medical clinic, however a traditional surrogacy may not necessarily require the services of a medical clinic.

This section will discuss the presumptions of parentage that should apply where children are carried by a surrogate, whether these presumptions should be the same for gestational and traditional surrogates, and whether they should apply where neither intended parent shares a genetic link with the child. This section will also discuss the processes for determining parentage where surrogates are used, and whether surrogacy agreements, in whole or in part, should be enforceable by a court.
4.3.i. Presumptions of Parentage

Each of the Canadian jurisdictions that have addressed surrogacy and parentage describe the surrogate as the birth mother or parent of the child. The jurisdictions then set out procedures for transferring or relinquishing parentage to the intended parents (and provisions ensuring the partner of the surrogate is not also deemed a parent of the child). None of the jurisdictions in Canada has prioritized intention over gestation by deeming the intended parents to be the parents of the child upon the birth of the child and not requiring the consent of the surrogate to the transfer of parentage following the birth. The discussion in this section will follow this same model; whether this model should be followed will be discussed in more detail under part 4.3.iii (enforceability of surrogacy agreements).

In Alberta, one of the intended parents must have a genetic link to the child in order for the surrogacy provisions of the AB FLA to apply. Clause 8.2(1)(b) specifies that an application can be made to the court for a declaration that a person whose human reproductive material was used in the assisted reproduction is a parent of the child. Subsection 8.2(6) requires the court to make the declaration if the court is satisfied that the child was born with the use of human reproductive material from the intended parent. The non-genetically related intended parent would then be deemed a parent under the general assisted reproduction presumptions of parentage provisions. Both intended parents are then deemed to be the parents at and from the time of the birth of the child.

In British Columbia, the intended parents are the parents of the child on the birth of the child if after the child’s birth the surrogate gives written consent to surrender the child to the intended parents and the intended parents take the child into their care. There is no requirement that either of the intended parents be genetically related to the child. The BC FLA contemplates the death of the intended parents after conception, providing that the deceased intended parents

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158 BC FLA, supra note 47 at s. 29(2)(b); AB FLA supra note 52 at s. 8.1. Section 6(1) of Ontario’s CLRO, supra note 57 states: “The birth parent of a child is, and shall be recognized in law to be, a parent of the child” and s. 6(2) provides that s. 6(1) is subject to the relinquishment of an entitlement to parentage by a surrogate under the Act or a court declaration to that effect. Section 4 of Nova Scotia’s Birth Registration Regulations, supra note 69 requires the woman who gives birth to a child to be recorded as the mother of the child.

159 Section 8.1(2)(b) of the AB FLA, supra note 52 applies if the birth mother is a surrogate, and the child was created with the male intended parent’s gametes: the male intended parent’s partner will be considered a parent of the child if they were married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with the male person at the time of the child’s conception and if they consented to be a parent of the child born as a result of assisted reproduction and did not withdraw the consent prior to conception. Section 8.1(3)(b) is a similar provision in the event the child was created with the intended mother’s gametes.

160 AB FLA, supra note 52 at s. 8.2(7).

161 BC FLA, supra note 47 at s. 29(3).
are the child’s parents if the surrogate gives written consent to surrender the child to the personal representative or other person acting in the place of the deceased intended parents.\textsuperscript{162}

In Ontario, there can be up to four intended parents of a child born through a surrogacy agreement, without any need for a court declaration. If there are to be more than four intended parents, any party to the surrogacy agreement may apply to the court for a declaration of parentage within one year of the child’s birth.\textsuperscript{163} The intended parents will be the parents of the child (and the surrogate will cease to be a parent of the child) once the surrogate provides written consent to relinquish her entitlement to parentage after the birth (this consent cannot be given before the child is seven days old).\textsuperscript{164} The CLRO requires there to have been a pre-conception written agreement and for each party to have received independent legal advice prior to entering into the agreement.\textsuperscript{165} During the seven day period after the child is born, the surrogate and the intended parents share the rights and responsibilities of a parent.\textsuperscript{166}

Nova Scotia’s Birth Registration Regulations\textsuperscript{167} allows the intended parents to apply to the court for a declaratory order with respect to the parentage of the child. The surrogacy arrangement must have been initiated by the intended parents and planned before conception, and one of the intended parents must have a genetic link to the child. The Court may order that the surrogate mother’s name be removed from the birth registration, and that the names of the intended parents be added.

The Uniform Act allows the intended parent(s) to apply for a declaratory order of parentage if at least one of the applicants provided the human reproductive material or embryo, the other applicant was married to or in a common-law partnership with the genetically related applicant, the applicants consented to be the parents of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction, and the surrogate consented to relinquish her entitlement to be a parent after the birth of the child.\textsuperscript{168} The surrogate and the applicant jointly have the rights and responsibilities of a parent from the time the surrogate gives the required consent until an order is made, however once an order is made, it is deemed effective from birth.\textsuperscript{169} The commentary to this provision explains that requiring the surrogate’s consent after the birth is:

\begin{quote}
consistent with the principle that the birth mother is always the legal mother of the child at the time of the birth. It allows for legal certainty immediately following the birth so that there is a
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\item \textsuperscript{162} BC FLA, supra note 47 at s. 19(5).
\item \textsuperscript{163} ON CLRA, supra note 57 at s. 11(1). Section 11(2) stipulates that the application cannot be made until the child is born, and unless the court orders otherwise, after the child’s first birthday.
\item \textsuperscript{164} \textit{ibid} at s. 10(3)-(4). If the surrogate fails to consent (either because she refuses, is deceased, or cannot be located), any party to a surrogacy agreement may apply to the court for a declaration of parentage (s. 10(6)).
\item \textsuperscript{165} \textit{ibid} at s. 10(2).
\item \textsuperscript{166} \textit{ibid} at s. 10(5).
\item \textsuperscript{167} NS Reg 290/2007.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Uniform Act, supra note 89 at s. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{169} \textit{ibid} at s. 8(8) and (10).
\end{itemize}
legal parent who can provide consent to medical treatment for the child before court declarations can issue with respect to the intended parents, and for the possibility that the surrogate may change her mind following the establishment of a gestational link to the child that has resulted in an emotional attachment between the birth mother and the child.\textsuperscript{170}

The New Zealand Law Commission has suggested that the intended parents should be able to obtain a pre-birth interim order granting them legal parentage over the child. The order would become final 21 days after the child’s birth upon the provision of evidence that at least one of the intended parents is genetically related to the child, and providing that the surrogate did not petition the court to overturn the interim order.\textsuperscript{171} The Commission also recommended that if a dispute as to the child’s parentage arises within the 21 days after the child’s birth, the court should determine the parentage of the child according to the best interests of the child.\textsuperscript{172} If the parties did not obtain a pre-birth interim order, the Commission recommended there be a 6 month window whereby parentage can be transferred to the intended parents other than by adoption. The Commission suggested that the court should make the order extinguishing the parental status of the surrogate and granting parentage to the intended parents if satisfied that: the surrogate is over 18 years old and already has one child, the child is a genetic child of at least one of the intending parties, the surrogacy was altruistic, the intended parents and the surrogate have had separate and joint counselling, the surrogate mother and her partner have entered into the arrangement voluntarily and have given their unconditional consent to the making of the order, having had independent legal advice, and, making the order is in the best interests of the child.\textsuperscript{173}

The Victorian Law Reform Commission considered whether the intended parents should be deemed the child’s parents from birth, as opposed to requiring parentage to be transferred from the birth mother to the intended parents. The Commission recommended against such an approach on the basis that:

\begin{quote}
[t]here are sufficient complexities in surrogacy arrangements to justify a cautious approach when dealing with legal parentage. The welfare of the child must be the paramount consideration and the interests of both the commissioning parents and the surrogate must be protected. For this reason, the Commission has concluded that the transfer of legal parentage from the surrogate to the commissioning couple should not be automatic. Instead, it should involve a process which
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[170] \textit{Uniform Act, supra} note 89 at commentary to s. 8.
\item[171] \textit{New Zealand Report, supra} note 95 at 93.
\item[172] \textit{Ibid} at 94. The Commission suggests the court should take the following into consideration when determining the best interests of the child: the genetic relationships between child and adults, the gestational relationship between child and adult, the intentions of all parties, the sibling relationships of the child, the comparative potential ability of each of the parties to be fit and proper parents of the child, the ability of each of the parties to facilitate the child’s relationships with the other parties, should that be considered by the court to be desirable, and whether issues could be resolved by guardianship and parenting orders, rather than declarations of legal parenthood in relation to each of the parties.
\item[173] \textit{New Zealand Report, supra} note 95 at 94.
\end{footnotes}
treats the surrogate as the parent of the child and requires all parties to meet certain specified criteria before legal parentage can be transferred.\textsuperscript{174}

**Gestational vs Traditional Surrogacies**

In a gestational surrogacy, the birth mother is not genetically related to the child; the link between the surrogate and the child is one of gestation only. In a traditional surrogacy, the birth mother has donated her own ova to conceive the child, and thus the surrogate is linked genetically and gestationally to the child.

None of the surrogacy specific parentage statutory provisions in Canada distinguish between gestational and traditional surrogacies. Notably, most of the states in the United States that permit surrogacy only permit gestational surrogacy agreements.\textsuperscript{175}

The *UPA (2017)* regulates gestational and traditional surrogacies differently. Under a gestational surrogacy agreement, each intended parent is, by operation of law, a parent of the child on the child’s birth, and neither the surrogate nor the surrogate’s spouse is considered to be parent of the child.\textsuperscript{176} A party to a gestational surrogacy agreement may, before, on, or after the birth of a child conceived by assisted reproduction apply for a court order declaring that:

- each intended parent is a parent of the child and ordering that parental rights and duties vest immediately on the birth of the child exclusively in each intended parent;
- the gestational surrogate and the surrogate’s spouse or former spouse, if any, are not the parents of the child;
- designating the content of the birth record in accordance with state law to designate each intended parent as a parent of the child;
- the court record be not open to inspection.\textsuperscript{177}

Traditional surrogates are entitled to withdraw their consent to surrender the child to the intended parents up until 72 hours after birth. In cases of traditional surrogacy, the *UPA (2017)* provides that the court shall order that each intended parent is a parent of the child, and the surrogate and her partner are not parents of the child, provided the traditional surrogacy agreement was validated by a court and provided the surrogate does not withdraw her consent in the 72 hours following the birth of the child.\textsuperscript{178} If the traditional surrogate withdraws her consent within 72 hours, the parentage of the child will be determined under the non-assisted reproduction parentage provisions of the *UPA (2017)*.

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\textsuperscript{174} Victorian Report, supra note 101 at 188.

\textsuperscript{175} *UPA (2017)*, supra note 117 at commentary to Article 8.

\textsuperscript{176} *Ibid* at s. 809(a) and (b).

\textsuperscript{177} *Ibid* at s. 8111(a).

\textsuperscript{178} *Ibid* at s. 815(a).
If the traditional surrogacy agreement was not validated by the court prior to conception, the court may validate the agreement before the birth of child provided all parties agree.\textsuperscript{179} If the agreement was not validated prior to birth and the surrogate withdraws her consent within 72 hours of the birth, the child’s parentage will be determined under the non-assisted reproduction parentage provisions of the \textit{UPA (2017)}.\textsuperscript{180} If the agreement was not validated prior to birth and the surrogate does not withdraw her consent within 72 hours, the traditional surrogate is not automatically a parent, and the court must determine parentage based on the best interests of the child the intent of the parties at the time of execution of the agreement.\textsuperscript{181}

\textbf{Genetic Link to Intended Parent(s)}

It is possible for a child being carried by a surrogate to be genetically related to one, both, or neither of the intended parents. There is variation between the jurisdictions that have considered this issue as to whether a genetic link is required to at least one of the intended parents for their surrogacy parentage provisions to be applicable. In jurisdictions where a genetic link to the child is required for the surrogacy provisions to be applicable, non-genetically related intended parents would have to adopt to be declared parents.

As discussed above, in Alberta, one of the intended parents must have a genetic link to the child for the surrogacy provisions of the \textit{AB FLA} to apply. The non-genetically related intended parent would then be deemed a parent under the general assisted reproduction presumptions of parentage provisions.\textsuperscript{182} Nova Scotia also requires that one of the intended parents have a genetic link to the child.\textsuperscript{183}

In British Columbia there is no requirement that either of the intended parents be genetically related to the child. The \textit{White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform} states that the majority of respondents did not think the requirements for intended parents to become parents should differ if neither of the intended parents are genetically related to the child.\textsuperscript{184} Ontario also does not require that one of the intended parents be genetically related to the child.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{179} \textit{Ibid} at s. 816(b).
\item\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Ibid} at s. 816(c).
\item\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Ibid} at s. 816(d).
\item\textsuperscript{182} Section 8.1(2)(b) of the \textit{AB FLA, supra} note 52 applies if the birth mother is a surrogate, and the child was created with the male intended parent’s gametes: the male intended parent’s partner will be considered a parent of the child if they were married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with the male person at the time of the child’s conception and if they consented to be a parent of the child born as a result of assisted reproduction and did not withdraw the consent prior to conception. Section 8.1(3)(b) is a similar provision in the event the child was created with the intended mother’s gametes.
\item\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Birth Registration Regulations, supra} note 69 at s. 5(2)(e).
\item\textsuperscript{184} \textit{White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform, supra} note 120 at 30.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The *Uniform Act* requires a genetic link to at least one of the intended parents in order for a court to make a declaration of parentage where a surrogate has been used.\(^{185}\) The commentary to this provision states:

Where there is no possible genetic link between at least one of the intended parents and the child, adoption is the appropriate path to parenthood...Alternatively, a court may make a declaration of parentage....

An option considered and rejected would have expanded this section to cover surrogacy without a genetic link between either of the intended parents and the child. The concern is that this approach could circumvent public policy around adoption and create an inconsistent approach to protecting the best interests of the child. While it could be argued that this approach can be distinguished from an adoption based on the presence of the intent to parent prior to conception, this seems a narrow distinction.

The New Zealand Law Commission recommended requiring there to be a genetic link to at least one intended parent, explaining:

Genetic connection is a value underlying legal parenthood laws, although the law has never created an exclusivity between parenthood and genetics. Rather it has formulated reallocation rules based on the degree of genetic connection between the child and the intending parents. Where neither intending parent will be the genetic parent of the child the state screens the parents to ensure their suitability. It is protective of the child’s vulnerability in the absence of a genetic connection. Where there is a genetic connection between both parents and the child, the law allocates parenthood automatically.\(^{186}\)

The Commission recommended that intended non-genetically related parents be required to undergo the same process and requirements as apply to an adoption, including screening for suitability.\(^{187}\)

In contrast, the Victorian Law Reform Commission did not recommend that a genetic link be required. The Commission stated that a genetic link is preferred, but was of the view that people should not be excluded from using a surrogate if they are unable to contribute their own gametes.\(^{188}\) The Commission did, however, recommend that there be mandatory counselling prior to the assisted conception procedure occurring at the clinic, and that the counselling include an assessment of the intended parents.\(^{189}\) If the surrogacy was a traditional surrogacy done outside of a clinic setting, the Commission recommended that the intended parents be required to adopt the child.\(^{190}\)

\(^{185}\) *Uniform Act*, supra note 89 at s. 8(3)-(5).

\(^{186}\) New Zealand Report, supra note 95 at para 3.18.

\(^{187}\) *Ibid* at para 7.67.

\(^{188}\) Victorian Report, supra note 101 at 15.

\(^{189}\) *Ibid* at 179.

\(^{190}\) *Ibid* at 190.
Arguments in favour of requiring a genetic link between the child and at least one of the intended parents reflects a concern that adoption processes may be circumvented. It is theoretically possible that individuals could claim they had a surrogacy agreement in place with a pregnant woman to allow them to claim the baby upon birth without going through the regular adoption procedures which require an extensive screening process. Arguments against requiring there to be a genetic link are based on the existence of a pre-conception intent to parent the child which differs from an adoption, a recognition that the (gestational) surrogate is also not genetically related to the child, and equality concerns raised by requiring intended parents who are unable to contribute genetic material at a disadvantage. As stated by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission:

In many ways, however, it seems incongruous to connect legal parentage solely to a genetic link, particularly when the surrogate mother will most often also have no genetic link to the child. All genetic parents may be unknown. Arguably, it also contravenes the principle that children should have equal status and protections regardless of the circumstances of their conception and certainty of status at the earliest reasonable time.\(^{191}\)

The Manitoba Law Reform Commission did not, however, reach a conclusion on this issue.\(^{192}\)

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**Consultation Questions**

10. What presumptions of parentage should apply to a surrogacy?

11. Should there be different presumptions of parentage and procedures for traditional and gestational surrogacies? If so, how should the presumptions differ?

12. Should the presumptions of parentage for a surrogacy apply to a surrogacy where neither intended parent has a genetic link to the child, or should that situation be subject to adoption procedures?

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**4.3.ii  Procedure for Determining Parental Status**

There are several issues to consider when creating a procedure for determining parental status when a surrogate is used. This section discusses the timing of the procedure (i.e. pre or post natal), the type of procedure (judicial or administrative), and the conditions to be met to make use of the procedure.

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\(^{191}\) Manitoba Report, *supra* note 1 at 35.

\(^{192}\) *Ibid* at 37.
**Timing of Procedure: Pre or Postnatal**

The timing of the procedure for determining parentage is connected in a sense to the enforceability of surrogacy agreements. In jurisdictions that render surrogacy agreements unenforceable, the procedure for determining parentage must happen after the birth of the child.

In Alberta, the application for a declaration of parentage must be made to the court within 30 days of the birth of the child.\(^{193}\) In British Columbia, the surrogate must provide written consent after the child’s birth to surrender the child, and thus the procedure is postnatal. This provision reflects the *White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform*, which states that the majority of commenters were of the view that the process should occur after the child’s birth.\(^{194}\)

In Ontario, the procedure is postnatal, and the surrogate is, notably, not able to consent to relinquishing their entitlement to parentage of the child before the child is seven days old.\(^{195}\) This seven day window reflects the adoption requirements in Ontario.

The *Uniform Act* requires the consent of the surrogate to relinquish her parentage after the birth of the child. The application for a declaration of parentage must be made within 30 days of the birth of the child.\(^{196}\)

Nova Scotia’s provision is unique in that it does not specifically provide that the application must be brought postnatally, and the section does not appear to require the child to have been born prior to the intended parents bringing the application for a declaratory order regarding parentage. Subsection 5(2) of the *Birth Registration Regulations* provides as follows:

On application by the intended parents in a surrogacy arrangement, the court may make a declaratory order with respect to the parentage of the child if all of the following apply:

- a) The surrogacy arrangement was initiated by the intended parents;
- b) The surrogacy arrangement was planned before conception;
- c) The woman who is to carry and give birth to the child does not intend to be the child’s parent;
- d) The intended parents intend to be the child’s parents;
- e) One of the intended parents has a genetic link to the child.

The New Zealand Law Commission recommended that the parties should be able to obtain a pre-birth interim court order determining legal parentage that would become final 21 days after birth, so long as the surrogate does not petition the court to overturn the interim order and proof of the genetic link to one of the intended parents has been provided to the court.\(^{197}\) At this point,

\(^{193}\) *AB FLA, supra* note 52 at s. 8.2(4).

\(^{194}\) *White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform* supra note 120 at 30.

\(^{195}\) *ON CLR, supra* note 57 at s. 10(4).

\(^{196}\) *Uniform Act, supra* note 89 at s. 8.

\(^{197}\) *New Zealand Report, supra* note 95 at 93.
the legal parenthood of the surrogate and her partner would be extinguished. If the parties failed to obtain a pre-birth order, the Commission recommended there be a six-month window during which the intended parents could obtain legal parentage without going through the adoption process.198

The Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended a 28-day waiting period before applications for declarations of parentage could be made.199

The UPA (2017) allows any party to a gestational surrogacy agreement to apply for a court order declaring parentage of the child in cases of gestational surrogacies. As the UPA (2017) deems the intended parents and not the gestational surrogate and her partner to be the parents of the child, this order can be sought before, on, or after the birth of the child.200 The court can issue an order or judgment under this section before the birth of the child, however the order cannot be enforced until the birth of the child.201

In cases of traditional surrogacy, the UPA (2017) provides that each intended parent is a parent of the child provided the traditional surrogacy agreement was validated by a court and provided the surrogate does not withdraw her consent in the 72 hours following the birth of the child.202 This procedure would occur after the birth of the child.

**Type of Procedure: Administrative or Judicial**

One argument for requiring a degree of oversight for the transfer of parentage from a surrogate to the intended parents is that having a court involved reduces the potential for surrogates to be exploited. On the other hand, others have argued that requiring a court process to transfer parentage imposes needless costs on intended parents and renders the process overly complex.

In Alberta, the procedure to transfer parentage of the child from the birth mother to the intended parents is a judicial procedure. Subsection 8.2(1) of the AB FLA allows an application to be made to the court for a declaration that the surrogate is not a parent to the child and that a person whose human reproductive material was used is a parent of the child. Nova Scotia’s and Newfoundland and Labrador’s surrogacy provisions also require a court application.203

The Uniform Act also requires a court order of a declaration of parentage when surrogacy is used. The commentary on this point provides:

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198 Ibid at 94.
199 Victorian Report, supra note 101 at 188.
200 UPA (2017), supra note 117 at s. 811(a).
201 Ibid at s. 811(b).
202 Ibid at s. 815(a).
203 Section 5 of the Birth Registration Regulations, supra note 59; Vital Statistics Act, 2009, SNL 2009, c V-6.01 at s. 5(6).
While it was initially contemplated that jurisdictions could decide whether court oversight or an administrative process was needed for parentage of intended parents, the Uniform Act requires a court declaration to ensure certainty of process. However, jurisdictions may wish to choose to allow the transfer of parentage to occur administratively through a registration process rather than require a court application.\textsuperscript{204}

Neither British Columbia nor Ontario require the intended parents of a child born through surrogacy to apply to a court for an order or declaration of parentage. In British Columbia, provided the requirements of s. 29 are met, the intended parents can file a statutory declaration with the British Columbia Vital Statistics Agency to have the child’s birth certificate amended. The British Columbia White Paper notes that most respondents preferred an out-of-court option as opposed to a court proceeding for allowing the intended parents to become legal parents.

Ontario also allows intended parents to register a child born to a surrogate by filling out certain forms. Both the intended parents\textsuperscript{205} and the surrogate\textsuperscript{206} are required to fill out statutory declarations, in addition to completing the statement of live birth. The statutory declaration by intended parents form requires the intended parent(s) (note that there can be up to four intended parents) to declare that:

- They entered into a surrogacy agreement prior to the conception of the child;
- They received independent legal advice before entering into the surrogacy agreement;
- The child was conceived through assisted reproduction;
- They have complied with all relevant surrogacy requirements in the \textit{CLRA} and the \textit{Vital Statistics Act};
- They agree that each intended parent is recognized in law to be a parent of the child; and
- They agree that the surrogate’s consent to relinquish any entitlement to parentage of the child was not provided until at least seven days after the birth of the child.

Ontario’s statutory declaration for surrogates requires the surrogate to declare that:

- She entered into a surrogacy agreement prior to the conception of the child;
- She received independent legal advice before entering into the surrogacy agreement
- The child was conceived through assisted reproduction;
- She has complied with all relevant surrogacy requirements in the \textit{CLRA} and the \textit{Vital Statistics Act};
- She consents to relinquish any and all entitlement to parentage of the child; and
- Her consent to relinquish any and all entitlement to parentage of the child was not provided until at least seven days after the birth of the child.

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Uniform Act}, supra note 89 at commentary to s. 8.

\textsuperscript{205} The statutory declaration for the intended parents can be found online at: Ontario Central Forms Repository, <http://www.forms.ssb.gov.on.ca/mbs/ssb/forms/ssbforms.nsf/FormDetail?OpenForm&ACT=RDR&TAB=PROFILE &SRCH=1&ENV=WWE&TIT=11333&NO=007-11333E>.

\textsuperscript{206} The statutory declaration for a surrogate can be found online at: Ontario Central Forms Repository <http://www.forms.ssb.gov.on.ca/mbs/ssb/forms/ssbforms.nsf/FormDetail?OpenForm&ACT=RDR&TAB=PROFILE &SRCH=&ENV=WWE&TIT=11334&NO=007-11334E>.
This aspect of Ontario’s surrogacy provisions has been questioned by some commentators, who argue that removing judicial oversight for surrogacy leaves room for coercion and fraud. Sara Cohen, a lawyer specializing in fertility law, suggests that judicial oversight is preferable and necessary for both traditional and gestational surrogacies, stating:

I have had potential clients come in for a meeting requesting that I assist them with a declaration of parentage for an alleged traditional surrogacy where the “surrogate” is about to give birth. When I advise that DNA testing will be required and that a court process will be involved, the potential clients admit that this is not in fact a surrogacy arrangement but that they found a pregnant woman who supposedly wants to relinquish her child and they would like to become the child’s parents without going through Ontario’s adoption process...Although the vast majority of intended parents conduct themselves ethically and appropriately, it is naïve and unrealistic to fail to recognize how desperate some people are to have children, and that some women are in fact vulnerable.

Cohen suggests that if there is to be no judicial oversight, then a middle ground option, such as the procedure followed in Illinois, would be preferable to a purely administrative procedure. In Illinois, the intended parents register the child’s birth as the child’s legal parents with the consent of the surrogate. Each party must have counsel that certifies they received independent legal advice and a written agreement was required. The medical clinic that performed the in vitro fertilization must also certify that the child is not related to the surrogate and was conceived through assisted reproduction. Illinois does not have a process in place to transfer parentage without an adoption in the case of traditional surrogacy.

The Manitoba Law Reform Commission stated it favoured “provisions for establishing parentage that do not depend on court processes in the context of surrogacy arrangements. Both the New Zealand Law Commission and the Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended there be judicial oversight over the transfer of parentage.

The UPA (2017) requires judicial oversight in the case of traditional surrogacies (both when the agreement is entered into, and to declare the intended parents as parents of the child), but not in the case of gestational surrogacies (although the parties to a gestational surrogacy agreement) may apply to the court for an order declaring parentage over the child.

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208 Ibid.

209 Ibid.

210 Manitoba Report, supra note 1 at 36.
Procedural Requirements

Alberta requires the consent of the surrogate, in a form provided for in the regulations, in order for a court to make a declaration that the surrogate is not the mother and that the intended parent is a parent to the child carried by the surrogate. Clause 8.2(8)(b) states that surrogacy agreements may not be used as evidence of consent of the surrogate to the application for a declaration that she is not the birth mother. A written pre-conception surrogacy agreement is not required.

For British Columbia’s surrogacy parentage provision (s. 29 of the BC FLA) to apply, there must be a written agreement entered into pre-conception between the intended parents and the surrogate. The agreement must provide that the surrogate will be the birth mother and on the child’s birth, the surrogate will not be a parent of the child, the surrogate will surrender the child to the intended parents, and the intended parents will be the child’s parents. Once the child is born the intended parent is the child’s parent if the following conditions are met:

a) before the child is conceived, no party to the agreement withdraws from the agreement;

b) after the child’s birth,
   i. the surrogate gives written consent to surrender the child to an intended parent or the intended parents, and
   ii. an intended parent or the intended parents take the child into his or her, or their, care.

Ontario’s surrogacy parentage provision applies if there is a written pre-conception surrogacy agreement in which the surrogate agrees not to be a parent of the child and each other party to the agreement (the section allows for up to four intended parents) agrees to be a parent of the child. In addition, each of the parties to the agreement must have received independent legal advice before entering into the agreement, and the child must be conceived through assisted reproduction (i.e. not through sexual intercourse). The intended parents become the legal parents of the child, and the surrogate ceases to be a parent of the child, once the surrogate has given consent in writing relinquishing her entitlement to parentage.

Nova Scotia’s provision refers to a pre-conception surrogacy arrangement as opposed to a surrogacy agreement, and there is no specific requirement that the “arrangement” be in writing.

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211 AB FLA, supra note 52 at s. 8.2(6)(b). This consent requirement may be waived if the surrogate is deceased or cannot be located after reasonable efforts have been made to locate her (s. 8.2(9)).

212 Section 29(4) of the BC FLA, supra note 47 allows the British Columbia Supreme Court to waive the consent required if the surrogate is deceased or incapable of giving consent, or cannot be located after reasonable efforts to locate her have been made.

213 BC FLA, supra note 47 at s. 29(3).

214 ON CLRA, supra note 57 at s. 10(2).

215 Ibid at s. 10(2).

216 Ibid at s. 10(3). Section 10(4) sets out that this consent cannot be provided before the child is seven days old.
Section 5 of the Birth Registration Regulations provides that the Court can make the declaratory order sought by the intended parents if:

a) the surrogacy arrangement was initiated by the intended parents;
b) the surrogacy arrangement was planned before conception;
c) the woman who is to carry and give birth to the child does not intend to be the child’s parent;
d) the intended parents intend to be the child’s parents;
e) one of the intended parents has a genetic link to the child.

This provision is somewhat unique in that the written consent of the surrogate to surrender the child after the birth is not specifically required. Further, it is possible that the surrogacy agreement could be used as evidence that the surrogate does not intend to be the child’s parent. Finally, it appears possible that the application could be made prior to the birth of the child.

Newfoundland and Labrador’s Vital Statistics Act, 2009 allows the registrar to register the intended parents of a child born through a surrogacy arrangement if an adoption order or a declaratory order regarding parentage has been made by the court under sections 6 or 7 of the Children’s Law Act (which generally allow the court to make declarations of parentage and non-parentage for mothers and fathers). These sections do not deal specifically with surrogacy, and thus there is no legislative requirement for a written agreement, or even the consent of the surrogate mother to the application.

For a court to grant the declaratory order provided for in the Uniform Act, the court must be satisfied that:

- the child was born as a result of assisted reproduction;
- at least one of the applicants provided the human reproductive material or embryo used in the assisted reproduction;
- the other applicant (if there is more than one) was married to or in a common-law partnership with the person who provided the human reproductive material or embryo
- the applicant(s) consented to be a parent of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction and did not withdraw that consent prior to the child’s conception; and
- after the birth of the child, the surrogate consented, in the prescribed form, to relinquish her entitlement to be a parent of the child, and to the application.\(^\text{217}\)

The Uniform Act does not explicitly require a written surrogacy agreement, however, a written surrogacy agreement would be useful in demonstrating that the applicants consented to be parents to a child born from a surrogate.

\(^{217}\) Uniform Act, supra note 89 at s. 8. Section 8(12) provides that the court can waive the consent required if the surrogate is deceased, incapable of giving consent, or cannot be found after reasonable efforts have been made to locate her.
The British Columbia Supreme Court has commented as follows on the importance of having a written surrogacy agreement in place:

The requirement of a written agreement has the salutary effect of clearly setting out the expectations and intentions of the parties before the conception of a child which, together with a child’s birth, is definitely an emotional and life-changing event...A lack of a written agreement raises the risk that a surrogate mother will have a change of heart and that there will be a contest concerning parentage once the child is born. The provisions in s. 29 [of the BC FLA] are intended to provide a clear path for all persons concerned as to what will happen upon the child’s birth and what rights will arise on the part of the respective parties.218

Angela Campbell states that it is not unequivocally established that surrogacy is benign to surrogates, given the potential risks to a woman’s physical and psychological well-being. She also notes that there are also risks for the intended parents, and that they may be the more vulnerable party in a surrogacy arrangement in some cases. Given these risks, she suggests that:

Care must be taken to equalize, to the extent possible, the bargaining power of the parties even when the surrogate is providing services out of apparent generosity or when her co-contractor is a family member. This can be achieved through various measures such as the provision of skilled and independent legal advice as well as psychosocial counselling.219

Karen Busby states that it is arguable that the surrogate’s post-birth consent and judicial oversight are important safeguards against exploitation.220 Busby suggests that the absence of any indicators of surrogacy related problems in Canada explains why provincial governments that have created procedures for surrogacy related parentage determinations have not required more than consent and judicial review.221

The UPA (2017) places several conditions on both gestational and traditional surrogacy agreements. In order to be eligible to enter into a gestational (or genetic) surrogacy agreement, the surrogate must be at least 21 years old, have previously given birth, must complete a medical evaluation and a mental-health consultation, and have independent legal representation through

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218 Family Law Act (Re), 2016 BCSC 598 at para 46. In this case, the parties had a verbal traditional surrogacy agreement in place, and following the child’s birth, the surrogate had surrendered custody of the child to the intended parents who then remained in their care. The surrogate recognized the intended parents as the parents of the child. At issue was whether the surrogacy parentage provision in s. 29 of the BC FLA could apply given that the parties had not entered into a written agreement prior to the child’s conception. The Court noted that had the agreement been in writing, the conditions in s. 29 would have been fulfilled, and no court application would have been required. The Court granted a declaration of parentage declaring the intended parents to be the child’s parents, and a declaration of non-parentage for the surrogate, and ordered the amendment of the child’s birth registration.

219 Campbell, “Law’s Suppositions”, supra note 8 at 55.

220 Busby, supra note 114 at 303.

221 Ibid.
the surrogacy arrangement. Each intended parent must be at least 21 years old, complete a medical evaluation and mental-health consultation, and have independent legal representation through the surrogacy arrangement. Each intended parent, the surrogate, and the surrogate’s spouse all must be parties to the agreement, the surrogate and intended parents must have independent legal representation through the arrangement, and the intended parents must pay for the surrogate’s independent legal representation. The surrogacy agreement must be executed before any medical procedure related to the surrogacy agreement occurs. Section 804 of the *UPA (2017)* sets out the required content of a gestational or surrogacy agreement.

The New Zealand Law Commission recommended that the pre-birth interim order determining legal parental status be issued if: the surrogate is over 18 years old and has already had one child, the child would be the genetic child of at least one of the intended parents, the surrogacy is altruistic, all parties have had separate and joint counselling, the surrogate mother and her partner have entered into the arrangement voluntarily and consent to the interim order after receiving independent legal advice.

The Victorian Law Reform Commission suggested that the courts should be able to make parentage orders in favour of the intended parents if the court is satisfied that the order would be in the best interests of the child, the application was made no earlier than 28 days after the birth and no later than 6 months after the birth of the child, the child is living with the intended parents, the parties were eligible to enter into a surrogacy arrangement, the surrogacy has been altruistic, and the surrogate consents to the order.

This discussion illustrates that there are several possible procedural requirements that could be imposed on any procedure to transfer parental status to the intended parents:

- Written agreement entered into pre-conception
- Independent legal advice for both parties
- Counselling for both parties
- Consent of the surrogate post delivery
- Counselling for both parties prior to entering into the written agreement
- A finding that the transfer of parentage would be in the best interests of the child

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222 *Ibid* at s. 802(a).
223 *Ibid* at s. 802(b).
224 *Ibid* at s. 803(3).
225 *Ibid* at s. 803 (7).
226 *Ibid* at s. 803(8).
227 *Ibid* at s. 803(9).
228 New Zealand Report, *supra* note 95 at 93.
229 Victorian Report, *supra* note 101 at 188.
**Consultation Questions**

13. Should relinquishing/transferring parental status be possible prior to birth? Why or why not?

14. Should relinquishing/transferring of parental status be an administrative or judicial procedure?

15. What conditions or requirements should be imposed on a procedure to relinquish/transfer parental status?

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**4.3.iii Enforceability of Surrogacy Agreements**

Intended parents and gestational surrogates are typically required by the assisted reproduction clinic to have entered into surrogacy agreements prior to implantation of an embryo. Traditional surrogates can conceive outside of assisted reproduction clinics, and as a result, there may or may not be a surrogacy agreement in place in cases of traditional surrogacy.230

In addition to setting out the intentions of the parties with regards to the parentage of the child to be gestated by the surrogate, a surrogacy agreement will typically contain a variety of other provisions related to the surrogacy arrangement. For instance, surrogacy agreements may contain the following types of provisions:

- a representation from the surrogate that they are healthy, capable of carrying a child, and will not form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship;
- a representation from the surrogate’s spouse that he will not make a claim of parentage;
- a provision that all parties be reasonably informed of material changes in circumstances, such as illness, change in insurance coverage etc;
- a requirement that the surrogate undergo a medical and psychological evaluation;
- an undertaking from the surrogate that she will:
  - undergo implantation of a maximum number of fertilized ova or ovum per implantation attempt;
  - deliver at a hospital;
  - renounce any presumptive rights to the child;
  - follow medical advice throughout the pregnancy;
  - give her doctor written consent to keep the intended parents informed during the pregnancy;

230 Given the potentially complex legal issues relating to the parentage of a child conceived through traditional surrogacy, most reproductive clinics in Canada will not provide in vitro fertilization services to a traditional surrogate (http://www.fertilitylawcanada.com/surrogacy-law-in-canada.html).
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- contact the intended parents at the first signs of labour;
- instruct the hospital that the child is to be treated as the child of the intended parents;
- allow the intended parents to make all decisions (e.g. name, medical care, discharge date from hospital) respecting the baby after delivery;
- cooperate with the parentage declaration court application as soon as practicable after birth;

• a provision setting out the parties’ intentions as to whether the intended parents will be invited to prenatal appointments and tests, and whether the intended parents will be present at the delivery;
• a provision setting out whether travel is permitted during pregnancy, and where travel is permitted;
• provisions regarding selective reduction, early termination, miscarriages and stillbirths;
• provisions setting out which expenses will be reimbursed and to what extent (e.g., medical expenses, travel expenses, child care, maternity clothing, housekeeping, legal expenses, after birth recuperation expenses)
• a provision specifying that if the surrogate is awarded custody of the child, the surrogate will reimburse the intended parents all monies paid to her under the agreement;
• provisions dealing with the custody of the child should both or one of the intended parents die prior to delivery;
• a provision requiring everyone to update their wills;
• a provision specifying that if the intended parents separate or divorce prior to delivery, the parentage application will proceed and the intended parents will determine custody in the usual forum;
• confidentiality clauses for all parties.

Even though surrogacy agreements are typically required by assisted reproduction clinics when gestational surrogates are used, Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec have each enacted provisions rendering surrogacy agreements unenforceable. Ontario’s CLRA, 1997\(^{231}\) provides as follows in s. 10(9):

A surrogacy agreement is unenforceable in law, but may be used as evidence of,

(a) an intended parent’s intention to be a parent of a child contemplated by the agreement; and
(b) a surrogate’s intention to not be a parent of a child contemplated by the agreement.

Alberta’s FLA\(^{232}\) provides as follows in s. 8.2(8):

Any agreement under which a surrogate agrees to give birth to a child for the purpose of relinquishing that child to a person

(a) is not enforceable,
(b) may not be used as evidence of consent of the surrogate under subsection (6)(b) [postnatal declaration of parentage to the intended parents], and

\(^{231}\)Supra note 57.
\(^{232}\) Supra note 52.
(c) may be used as evidence of consent for the purposes of section 8.1(2)(b)(ii) or (3)(b)(ii) [presumptions of parentage for the intended parents].

In Quebec, surrogacy agreements are explicitly stated to be absolutely null in Article 541 of the *Civil Code*.\(^{233}\)

The *BC FLA* requires a written contract between the intended parents and the surrogate in order to transfer parentage to the intended parents after the child is born.\(^{234}\) The surrogate’s consent is also required to transfer parentage to the intended parents.\(^{235}\) However, the *BC FLA* provides that the agreement cannot be used as evidence of the surrogate’s consent to transfer legal parentage, but instead can be used as evidence of the intentions of the intended parents with respect to the child’s parentage if a dispute arises after the child’s birth.\(^{236}\)

The *Uniform Act* also states that surrogacy agreements are unenforceable,\(^{237}\) and may not be used as evidence of consent for the purposes of establishing the surrogate’s consent to relinquish her entitlement to parentage.\(^{238}\) The surrogacy agreement can, however, be used as evidence of the intended parent’s consent to be parents of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction (for the purposes of a declaration of parentage in a surrogacy situation).\(^{239}\) The commentary to this provision states succinctly: “It is not consistent with public policy or with the court’s overarching *parens patriae* responsibilities to allow surrogacy contracts to be enforceable.”\(^{240}\)

The *UPA (2017)*, in contrast, specifically provides that gestational surrogacy agreements meeting certain requirements are enforceable.\(^{241}\) Section 812 sets out the ways in which a gestational surrogacy agreement may or may not be enforced:

- if the gestational surrogacy agreement does not comply with the requirements for enforceability (ie the conditions for entering into an agreement, and the content of the agreement), the court shall determine the rights and duties of the parties consistent with the intent of the parties at the time of execution;

\(^{233}\) *Civil Code, supra* note 62 at Article 541.

\(^{234}\) *Section 29 of the BC FLA, supra* note 47 sets out the rules for determining parentage if there is a surrogacy arrangement. Pursuant to s. 29(2), the section applies if:

\(^{235}\) *BC FLA, supra* note 47 at s. 29(6).

\(^{236}\) *Ibid* at s. 29(6).

\(^{237}\) *Uniform Act, supra* note 89 at s. 11(a).

\(^{238}\) *Ibid* at s. 11(b).

\(^{239}\) *Ibid* at s. 11(c).

\(^{240}\) *Ibid* at commentary to s. 8.

\(^{241}\) *UPA (2017), supra* note 117 at s. 812.
• specific performance is not a remedy available for breach of a gestational surrogate of a provision in the agreement that the gestational surrogate be impregnated, terminate or not terminate a pregnancy, or submit to medical procedures;
• if an intended parent is determined to be a parent of the child, specific performance is available for:
  o a breach by the gestational surrogate which prevents the intended parent from exercising immediately on birth of the child the full rights of parentage; or
  o a breach by the intended parent which prevents the intended parent’s acceptance, immediately on birth of the child conceived by assisted reproduction under the agreement, of the duties of parentage.

In order for traditional surrogacy agreements to be enforceable under the *UPA (2017)*, the agreement must be validated by the court prior to conception.²⁴² Courts are required to issue an order validating the agreement if the requirements for a surrogacy agreement are met and the court is satisfied that all parties entered into the agreement voluntarily and understand its terms.²⁴³ Intended parents may terminate the agreement at any time before a gamete or embryo is transferred.²⁴⁴ A traditional surrogate may withdraw consent to the agreement at any time before 72 hours after the birth of the child.²⁴⁵ Once the agreement is terminated by either party, the parties are released from all obligations under the agreement except that the intended parents remain responsible for all expenses incurred by the surrogate until the date of termination, which are reimbursable under the agreement.²⁴⁶ Unless there has been fraud, the traditional surrogate and their spouse are not liable to the intended parents for any penalty or liquidated damages.²⁴⁷

Section 819 of the *UPA (2017)* sets out the ways in which a traditional surrogacy agreement may or may not be enforced:

• if a traditional surrogacy agreement is breached by the surrogate or the intended parents the non-breaching party is entitled to the remedies at law or in equity;
• specific performance is not available for breach by a surrogate of a requirement of a validated or non-validated traditional surrogacy agreement that the surrogate be impregnated, terminate or not terminate a pregnancy, or submit to medical procedures;
• specific performance is available for a breach by the surrogate of a requirement which prevents an intended parent from exercising the full rights of parentage 72 hours after the birth;
• specific performance is available for breach by an intended parent which prevents the intended parent’s acceptance of duties of parentage 72 hours after the birth.

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²⁴² *Ibid* at s. 813(a).
²⁴³ *Ibid* at s. 813(b).
²⁴⁴ *Ibid* at s. 814(a)(1).
²⁴⁵ *Ibid* at s. 814(a)(2).
²⁴⁶ *Ibid* at s. 814(b).
²⁴⁷ *Ibid* at s. 814(c).
Enforceability of Provisions Related to Parentage

The majority of surrogacy arrangements proceed exactly as they were intended to: the surrogate delivers the infant, and the infant is then taken and raised by the intended parents as their child. Therefore, whether provisions relating to parentage of a child carried by a surrogate should be enforceable by a court is only relevant to the small number of potential cases where a dispute over the child’s parentage could arise. It is important to note at the outset that disputes over the child’s parentage could conceivably go both ways; a surrogate could refuse to handover the infant, and the intended parents could change their mind at some point during the pregnancy and refuse to take the infant.

The arguments for rendering surrogacy agreements unenforceable relate to concerns surrounding the potential vulnerabilities of both the women acting as surrogates and the children gestated by surrogates. There is a concern that women may be exploited in a surrogacy arrangement, and that children may become objects of exchange, both of which are some of the reasons why some countries ban commercial surrogacy. In addition, allowing a surrogate to change her mind post-birth recognizes the gestational relationship that can be formed between the surrogate and the child. As Wanda Wiegers states:

Busby and Vun note that most of the empirical evidence to date suggests that gestational mothers are generally satisfied with their role in the process and detach early in the pregnancy. Nonetheless, there are cases where gestational mothers have bonded or attached during pregnancy, experienced distress and refused to relinquish the child, contrary to the expectations of all parties. Special provision for gestational mothers responds to gender equity by recognizing the significant role played by them in the life of the newborn child, the efforts and risks of gestation and the inability to predict accurately the consequences of conception, including the occurrence of pre-natal bonding.

Further, as pointed out by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission: “Allowing surrogacy contracts to be enforceable is consistently argued to be inconsistent with public policy, women’s personal autonomy rights and the principle that no agreement can displace the court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to act in the best interests of the child.”

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248 Susan G. Drummond, “Fruitful Diversity: Revisiting the Enforcement of Gestational Carriage Contracts” in Regulating Creation: The Law, Ethics, and Policy of Assisted Human Reproduction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 275 states at 308: “the risk of intended parents failing to honour their part of the bargain and assume parental responsibility for the child carried by the surrogate is extremely minimal, to the point of being effectively non-existent in practice. The evidence also reveals that the incidence of carriers failing to honour their intentions entrenched in gestational contracts has been extremely low in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom since the Baby M case in 1988.”

249 Wiegers, supra note 9 at 198-199.

250 Manitoba Report, supra note 1 at 33.
However, some have argued that surrogacy agreements should be enforceable because there is evidence to suggest that the policy concerns that initially led to decisions to render surrogacy agreements unenforceable are misplaced: “the empirical research indicates that those vulnerabilities [of surrogates and the children they gestate] may not be sufficiently acute, where they exist at all, to override the policy concerns (including the best interests of children) that might be furthered by enforcing regulated carriage contracts.”\textsuperscript{251} 

Susan Drummond argues that allowing surrogacy agreements to be enforceable (provided there is no unconscionability, fraud, error, or duress) would put surrogates “on notice from their outset of their undertaking that the children they give birth to will not be their legal children.”\textsuperscript{252} In Drummond’s view, a rule that the surrogacy agreement will be enforced would mean:

A woman who enters a gestational carriage contract would be doing so knowing that the law speaks clearly on the implications of her decision – a result that would eliminate the harsh consequences for intended parents, who are currently beholden to the carrier’s potential ambivalence and exposed to considerable risks of emotional and financial loss and, in the current legal context, ongoing parental responsibilities if they are genetically related to the child (and quite possibly if they are not). The intended parents in gestational carriage contracts are after all not complete strangers to the child: they are the parties but for whom the pregnancy would not have been initiated, and they intend from the outset to be actively involved in the child’s care, whereas the gestational carrier does not.\textsuperscript{253}

Drummond suggests that given the increasing evidence that gestational carriage results in “little tangible harm”, it would be “regrettable…to follow a model, such as the one proposed in the Uniform Child Status Act, that hinges on an outdated understanding of the realities on the ground.”\textsuperscript{254}

Whether provisions relating to parentage should be enforceable by a court could differ between gestational and traditional surrogacy agreements. In a gestational surrogacy, the child is not genetically related to the surrogate, and thus the gestational surrogate’s relationship to the child is solely through gestation. In a traditional surrogacy, the child is genetically related to the surrogate, and thus the traditional surrogate’s relationships to the child is both genetic and gestational. Traditional and genetic surrogates are similar, however, in that neither intends to be the mother of the child. Additionally, whether provisions relating to parentage are enforceable may depend on which party is disputing the surrogacy agreement.

The UPA (2017) treats gestational and traditional surrogacies differently on this point. When a gestational surrogate is used, the intended parents are, on birth of the child, the parents of the

\textsuperscript{251} Drummond, supra note 248 313.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid at 313.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid at 313-314.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid at 314.
child, and neither the surrogate nor her partner are the parents. The UPA (2017) also provides that gestational surrogacy agreements are enforceable if certain requirements are met. In contrast, in order for a traditional surrogacy agreement to be enforceable, the agreement must be validated by the court. Traditional surrogates can withdraw their consent to the agreement up to 72 hours after the birth of the child.

The Victorian Law Reform Commission considered whether the parentage provisions of surrogacy agreements should be enforceable and received mixed responses during its public consultations. Some respondents suggested they should be enforceable on the basis that certainty with regards to the outcome would help the surrogate cope with the pregnancy and relinquish the child after birth. Those not in favour of enforcing the parentage provisions made several arguments, including: the genetic connection of the intended parents should not necessarily displace the gestational connection the surrogate has to the child; the intention or capacity of a person to parent can change over time and intentions should not be viewed as “fixed determinants” of what is in the child’s best interests; and when there is a dispute as to parentage, the court should make a determination in accordance with the best interests of the child. The Commission concluded that surrogacy agreements should not be enforceable, stating:

The Commission has concluded that the law should not compel the surrogate to hand over the baby to the commissioning couple if she decides that she cannot bring herself to do so...The surrogate mother should be recognized as the parent of the child unless she consents to the making of a court order transferring parentage to the commissioning parent(s) after the child is born. Before an order can be made, the child must have lived with the commissioning parents for a specified period. This principle should apply whether or not the surrogate is genetically related to the child.

An alternative option to allowing surrogacy agreements to be enforceable with regards to parentage, would be to enact a legislative provision stating that in the event of a conflict between the intended parents and the surrogate the parentage provisions of surrogacy agreements are presumed to be in the best interests of the child.

**Enforceability of Provisions Not Related to Parentage**

While the focus of this consultation project is on the parentage of children conceived through assisted reproduction, it is possible that a legislative provision could be drafted to provide that

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255 UPA (2017), supra note 117 at s. 809.
256 Ibid at s. 812.
257 Ibid at s. 813.
258 Ibid at s. 814(a)(2).
259 Victorian Report, supra note 101 at 188.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid at 189.
while the surrogacy agreement is not determinative of the child’s parentage, all or some of the other provisions in the surrogacy agreement are nevertheless enforceable. These agreements are typically drafted by legal counsel, and both parties presumably dedicate time and resources into determining the content of these agreements. An argument could certainly be made that allowing the courts to enforce some of the provisions in a surrogacy agreement would best protect the interests of both the intended parents and the surrogate.

**Conditions for Enforceability of a Surrogacy Agreement**

Conditions for enforceability of all or some of a surrogacy agreement could be prescribed in legislation. For instance, in order for a surrogacy agreement (or certain provisions of a surrogacy agreement) to be enforceable by a court, legislation could require that both parties had to have obtained independent legal advice regarding the agreement, that the agreement be in writing, and that the surrogacy agreement be entered into prior to conception. These conditions may differ for traditional and gestational surrogacies. The *UPA (2017)* imposes the same requirements on gestational and traditional surrogacy agreements with respect to eligibility to enter into the agreement, and the content of the agreement.

**Consultation Questions**

16. Should surrogacy agreements, including provisions related to parentage, be enforceable? Should there be a distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacies? Why or why not?

17. If parentage related provisions in surrogacy agreements should not be enforceable, should other types of provisions in surrogacy agreements be enforceable? Should legislation specify which types of provisions are and are not enforceable? Why or why not?

18. Should there be conditions on whether the surrogacy agreement, or a certain type of provision in the agreement, is enforceable? If so, what should those conditions be?

**4.4 Multiple Parents**

Conceiving a child through assisted reproduction differs in one fundamental respect from conceiving a child through sexual intercourse: there are more than two parties involved in the planning and actual conception of the child (except in the case of a heterosexual couple using IVF...
services with their own reproductive material). Given this difference, it is possible for more than two people to claim to be, or to be claimed to be, parents of the child.

Multiple-parent families already exist in Canada. According to Fiona Kelly, there is a small but significant number of female same-sex couples parenting in a multiple-parent framework who support the legal recognition of other parties – typically known sperm donors and their partners - in the multiple-parent framework.263

In the case of AA v BB, discussed above, the Ontario Court of Appeal issued a declaration resulting in the child having three legal parents: his same-sex mothers and his sperm donor.

Alberta’s legislation does not allow for more than two legal parents. The AB FLA provides that the court cannot make a declaration of parentage in regard to a surrogacy if the declaration would result in the child having more than two parents.264 Clause (7)(b) of the AB FLA similarly prohibits the court from making a declaration of parentage where surrogacy has not been used if the declaration would result in the child having more than two parents. Prince Edward Island also stipulates a maximum of two legal parents.265

Both British Columbia and Ontario, however, allow for more than two parents in certain circumstances. British Columbia’s multiple parent provision is s. 30 of the BC FLA. The provision applies in two circumstances:

- where there is a written pre-conception agreement between the intended parent(s) and a potential birth mother who agrees to be a parent together with the intended parent(s), or
- where there is a written pre-conception agreement between the potential birth mother, a person who is married to or in a marriage-like relationship with the potential birth mother, and a donor who agrees to be a parent together with the potential birth mother and a person married to or in a marriage-like relationship with the potential birth mother.

The written pre-conception agreement must provide that the potential birth mother will be the birth mother of a child conceived through assisted reproduction and that on the child’s birth, the parties to the agreement will be the parents of the child.

Fiona Kelly has described s. 30 as being fairly radical and one of the first three-parent provisions in the world.266 Interestingly, s. 30 did not receive any opposition during British Columbia’s public consultation on the new Family Law Act, and was not subject to much debate in the legislature.267 Kelly comments:

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263 Kelly, “Multiple-Parent Families”, supra note 141 at 569.
264 AB FLA, supra note 52 at s. 8.2(12).
265 PEI CSA, supra note 80 at s. 9(8).
266 Kelly, “Multiple-Parent Families”, supra note 141 at 580.
267 Ibid.
It is difficult to know why the reforms garnered such little attention and why the three-parent provision, one of only a few of its kind in the world, received virtually no comment at all. One can only presume that the provisions were considered uncontroversial – simply a reflection of the “changing reality” of Canadian families – though it is also possible that they were overshadowed by the other substantial changes to BC family law that the FLA introduced.\(^\text{268}\)

Kelly criticizes s. 30 for not reflecting how some same-sex mothers engage in multiple-parenting. Section 30 requires the third parent to have a gestational or genetic link to the child, and it does not include that person’s spouse or partner. However, Kelly suggests that this may not reflect the reality of multiple-parenting, stating:

> [e]mpirical research indicates that, where a lesbian couple have a parenting arrangement with a gay couple, the mothers typically consider both the child’s biological father and his male partner to be the child’s parents...their children also do not distinguish between the two men based in biological relatedness.\(^\text{269}\)

Kelly also states that while the majority of lesbian women who engage in multiple parenting do so with their conjugal partner, this is not necessarily always the case. In her view, limiting s. 30 to the non-biological parent in a conjugal relationship with the biological parent is contrary to the purpose of the new parentage provisions as it does not protect these children’s best interests or promote stable family relationships.\(^\text{270}\)

Ontario also has multiple parent (i.e. more than two parent) provisions for assisted reproduction with and without surrogacy. In situations where there is not a surrogacy, s. 9(4) of the \textit{CLRO} allows up to four people to be recognized as parents. There must be a written pre-conception parentage agreement in which two or more parties, including the birth parent, agree to be, together, the parents of a child. If the child is to be conceived through sexual intercourse, the person whose sperm is to be used must also be a party to the agreement. If the child is to be conceived through assisted reproduction, the spouse of the person who intends to be the birth parent must also be a party to the agreement, unless they intend to not be a parent.\(^\text{271}\) If the birth parent’s spouse does not intend to parent, they must, prior to conception, provide a written confirmation that he or she does not consent to be a parent of the child. Where a surrogacy is involved, s. 11(1) provides that any party to the surrogacy agreement may apply to the court for a declaration of parentage respecting the child. The application cannot be made until the child is born and must be made before the child’s first birthday.\(^\text{272}\)

The \textit{Uniform Act} also allows for a child born through assisted reproduction to have up to six parents in certain circumstances. Subsection 9(5) allows an individual who provided the human reproductive material or the embryo used in the assisted reproduction or who was married or in

\(^{268}\) \textit{Ibid.}\n\(^{269}\) \textit{Ibid} at 583.\n\(^{270}\) Kelly, “Multiple Parent Families” \textit{supra} note 141 at 585.\n\(^{271}\) \textit{ON CLRA}, \textit{supra} note 57 at s. 9(2).\n\(^{272}\) \textit{Ibid} at s. 11(2).
a common-law partnership with the person who provided the human reproductive material or embryo at the time of the child’s conception to apply for a declaratory order that they are an additional parent of the child. The application must be brought within 30 days of the birth of the child, and there must have been an agreement to parent to be declared an additional parent prior to conception in place between the applicant(s), the child’s birth mother, and the person presumed to be a legal parent of the child under the presumptions of parentage. The commentary to this provision explains:

Again, the cornerstone here is the intention to be a parent. The principle concern in these cases is to provide certainty and clarity (1) in the best interests of the child, (2) for the potential parents, (3) for the donor in terms of parentage, and (4) regarding legal responsibilities and status in dealing with estates, benefits, support, etc.

The proposed approach is similar to recommendations by both the New Zealand Law Commission and the Victorian Law Reform Commission, and to the decision in the Ontario case of AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2.

In theory, under this provision, a child could have a maximum of six parents – the birth mother, her spouse or common-law partner, the two donors who agreed prior to conception to be parents of the child (where the resulting embryo is carried by the birth mother), and the spouses or common-law partners of the donors. However, in most instances, it will result in a maximum of three parents – the birth mother, her spouse or common-law partner, and the donor who all agreed prior to conception to be the child’s parents.273

The *Uniform Act* differs from the *BC FLA* and the *ON CLRA* (in cases of assisted reproduction without surrogacy) in its requirement that a court order be sought to recognize additional parents.

The *UPA (2017)* provides two alternative provisions dealing with multiple parents. The first is simply: “The court may not adjudicate a child to have more than two parents under this Act.”274 The second alternative provision provides a more nuanced position:

The court may adjudicate a child to have more than two parents under this Act if the court finds that failure to recognize more than two parents would be detrimental to the child. A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any parent or individual seeking an adjudication of parentage. In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the harm if the child is removed from a stable placement with an individual who has fulfilled the child’s physical needs and psychological needs for care and affection and has assumed the role for a substantial period.275

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273 Uniform Act, supra note 89 at commentary to s. 9.
274 UPA (2017), supra note 117 at s. 613(a).
275 Ibid at s. 613(b).
Some commentators suggest there is a risk that the recognition of multiple parent families will result in the courts “finding fathers” for female same-sex families.276 On the other hand, allowing for recognition of a multiple parents only when the parties have agreed to such an arrangement may encourage female same-sex couples who would prefer to use known sperm donors to do so, as they would have a higher degree of certainty that the rights of the non-biological parent would not be trumped by the donor.277

The Manitoba Law Reform Commission has suggested that multiple parenting arrangements be contained in written agreements:

[I]f the recognition of more than two legal parents in appropriate situations accurately reflects the considered choice of the parties and the reality of the intended family at the time of conception, it may provide more stability for the child, and perhaps reduce the potential for uncertainty and conflict in the event of relationship breakdown. The corollary is that the intention of the parties will be clear if they choose not to enter into a multiple parent agreement when that option is expressly available in legislation. This will also help to ensure that the parties’ intentions are carefully considered in advance and expressed in writing.278

The BC Branch of the Canadian Bar Association also suggested in its response to the new Family Law Act that third or fourth parties only be made parents by contractual agreement, making “plain the financial responsibilities for the parenting involved in a surrogate or donor relationship.”279

The New Zealand Law Commission recommended there not be a two-parent restriction in the legislation, and stated as follows regarding whether the potential for conflict was reason to limit the number of legal parents to two:

We have considered whether valid policy reasons exist to exclude the possibility of more than two parents at law. There may be a heightened potential for conflict; however, that in itself is not a reason to limit the number of parents. There is no restriction on how many guardians may be appointed in relation to one child, although the potential for conflict will be a significant factor in the court’s decision whether or not to appoint an additional guardian...

We also note that these children, and arrangements as to their creation, care and development, have usually been the subject of significant deliberation before conception and birth. While conflict can never be avoided, it is hoped that the greater deliberation and thought required before the parents enter this sort of arrangement will result in less potential conflict...Should the

277 Kelly, “Multiple-Parent Families”, supra note 141 at 570-71.
278 Manitoba Report, supra note 1 at 29.
relationships break down, a potential for difficulty is how the court will deal with issues of custody and access between the three parents. However, the courts encounter the same issues when stepfamilies separate and there are two genetic parents and another “social” parent who may play a significant role in the child’s life and with whom ongoing contact may be in the child’s best interests. We have also taken note of the fact that it is not uncommon for children to have multiple “de facto” parent figures in their lives through step-parenting or customary practices in Maori, Pacific Island and other cultures where extended families exist.280

The Commission recommended that a donor be allowed to be the child’s legal parent in addition to the intended parents provided there was a court approved agreement between the parties regarding the role of the donor in the child’s upbringing in place prior to conception, and evidence that all parties had received independent legal advice and counselling. These recommendations were not adopted, however New Zealand does have an “involved known donor” type of parental status, as discussed above.

The Victorian Law Reform Commission reached a different conclusion on this issue in 2007. The Commission recommended that there be a two-parent limit remain in place, stating:

This will not prevent people from forming families where several people act as parents. It remains possible, therefore, that in time, a process similar to that of opting...may emerge as a necessity for a greater number of families where the donor is regarded as a parent of the child. Legal recognition of non-birth mothers may be the first step towards developing a sense of confidence in and acceptance of diverse family types necessary for further reform.281

Prior to arriving at this conclusion, the Commission had, however, suggested that a donor be able to opt into the status of legal parent through adoption with the consent of the birth mother and her partner. The adoption would have to be made within the first year of the child’s life and after counselling and legal advice. The results of public consultation on this suggestion led to the Commission deciding against recommending this approach. The main criticism was that allowing for multiple-parents would be “messy” from a practical point of view.282 This practicality concern can be described as follows:

The concern that multiple-parent families might pose practical challenges particularly in situations of conflict, is the primary criticism raised by those who oppose multiple-parent recognition. It is argued that dealing with the interests of multiple parties may increase the complexity and uncertainty of family law disputes about custody, access, or financial support, an outcome that is unlikely to be in the interests of children. Practical matters that require parental consent, such as medical decision making, travel and schooling, could also become more complicated even in the absence of conflict.283

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280 New Zealand Report, supra note 95 at 70-71.
281 Victorian Report, supra note 101 at 139.
282 Kelly, “Multiple-Parent Families” supra note 141 at 574. The author also notes that concerns were raised about potential conflicts between federal and state law.
283 Ibid at 574-575.
Fiona Kelly has addressed the practical challenges argument by asserting that in practice, in most instances of multiple-parent families, parenting rights are allocated proportionately to parenting responsibilities. Kelly notes that allocating “rights and responsibilities between parents is not, in light of divorce and separation, a new concept. Parenting rights and responsibilities are frequently divided unequally between parties. Multiple-parent families therefore need not be as complex or uncertain as critics often suggest.”284 Kelly advocates permitting any person to apply to the court to opt into the status of legal parent within one year of the birth of the child, if the child’s legal parents consent.285

The Manitoba Law Reform Commission was of the view that setting out a statutory process for multiple parent arrangements would provide greater certainty to all parties, and the children, involved in assisted reproduction. However, the Commission was ultimately unable to recommend a preferred approach to the issue of multiple parents.286

Consultation Questions

19. Should the legislation allow for more than two parents? Why or why not?

20. If the legislation allows for more than two parents, what requirements or conditions should be imposed?

284 Ibid at 575.
285 Ibid at 587.
286 Manitoba Report, supra note 1 at 31-32:

Given the novelty of a statutory provision for the presumption of more than two legal parents, the Commission recommends caution when legislating in this area. The British Columbia provision has been in force for just over one year. There is little evidence available about what effect such provisions may have on the interests of the children born as a result of multi-parent arrangements.

At present, the Commission is not in a position to formulate a preferred approach to this question. Manitoba’s existing legislation does not appear to preclude a court order declaring an additional parent in circumstances the court considers appropriate, using its parens patriae jurisdiction. Before making any recommendations about statutory amendments in this area, the Commission considers that additional research, consultation and deliberation is required on questions about who should be eligible to be an additional parent, what conditions should be met, and whether additional parents should be presumed in the law without judicial intervention.
4.5 Posthumous Conception

The AHRA specifically prohibits using a person’s human reproductive material to create an embryo without that person’s written consent, and removing human reproductive material from a donor’s body after the donor’s death for the purpose of creating an embryo unless the donor has given written consent to its removal for that purpose. Thus it appears that the AHRA does not prohibit the use of frozen embryos or gametes if the deceased provided written consent.

There are various ways assisted reproduction could be used to conceive a child using the gametes of a deceased individual. For instance, a woman could use her deceased partner’s frozen sperm to artificially inseminate herself, or a man could use his deceased partner’s frozen ovum and his own reproductive material to create an embryo to be carried by a surrogate.

Alberta’s FLA does not contain a specific provision dealing with posthumous assisted conception.

British Columbia’s FLA contains a specific provision dealing with parentage if assisted reproduction occurs after death. Subsection 28(1) applies if the deceased gave written consent to the use of the human reproductive material or embryo after their death, gave written consent to be the parent of a child conceived after their death, and did not withdraw their consent before death. Once the child is born, the child’s parents are deemed to be the deceased person and the person who was married to, or in a marriage-like relationship with, the deceased person when that person died, regardless of whether he or she also provided human reproductive material used for the assisted reproduction.

Ontario’s CLRO also contains a specific provision dealing with posthumous conception using assisted reproduction. Subsection 12(1) allows the spouse of a deceased person to apply to the court for a declaration that the deceased person is a parent of a child conceived after his or her death through assisted reproduction. The application can only be made after the child is born, and it must be made within 90 days of the child’s birth. The Court can grant a declaration of parentage if the deceased consenting in writing to be a parent of a child conceived posthumously through assisted reproduction and did not withdraw their consent before his or her death.

The Uniform Act also contains a provision on posthumous conception, requiring the deceased individual to have consented in writing to be recognized as a parent of a child conceived posthumously, and for the consent to have not been withdrawn. The application for a declaration of parentage can only be made by the spouse or common-law partner of the

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287 AHRA, supra note 6 at s. 8(1).
288 Ibid at s. 8(2).
289 BC FLA, supra note 47 at s. 28(2).
290 ON CLR A, supra note 57 at s. 12(2).
291 Ibid.
292 Uniform Act, supra note 89 at s. 7(3).
deceased, or the person who is claiming to be the posthumously conceived child of the deceased. If, however, the child was born to a surrogate, only the person who was married to or in a common-law relationship with the deceased can apply for a declaratory order.

Consultation Question

21. Should Saskatchewan’s legislation contain a provision dealing with posthumous conception and parentage? Why or why not?

22. If so, how should the parentage of children conceived posthumously be determined? What conditions should be attached?

4.6 Children Born Outside of Saskatchewan

This section discusses the recognition in Saskatchewan of extraprovincial orders and birth certificates issued outside of Canada in cases of assisted reproduction, and whether there should be any limit on the ability of a Saskatchewan court to issue a declaratory order of parentage in cases of surrogacy based on the location of the child’s birth.

Extraprovincial Orders

Saskatchewan’s CLA, 1997 currently provides that extraprovincial declaratory orders made in Canada must be recognized and have the same effect as if they were made in Saskatchewan. International extraprovincial declaratory orders must be recognized provided the conflict of laws requirements in the section are met. Section 52 provides that courts may decline to recognize an extraprovincial order where there is new evidence or the court is satisfied that the extraprovincial declaratory order was obtained by fraud or duress.

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293 *Ibid* at s. 7(1),
294 *Ibid* at s. 7(2).
295 *CLA, 1997, supra* note 7 at s. 50.
296 Section 51 provides as follows: An extraprovincial declaratory order that was made outside Canada is to be recognized and have the same effect as if made in Saskatchewan if:

(a) At the time the proceeding was commenced or the order was made, either parent was domiciled:
   i. In the territorial jurisdiction of the court making the order; or
   ii. In a territorial jurisdiction in which the order is recognized;

(b) The court that made the order would have had jurisdiction to do so under the conflict of laws rules that are applicable in Saskatchewan;

(c) The child was habitually resident in the territorial jurisdiction of the court making the order at the time the proceeding was commenced or the order was made; or

(d) The child or either parent had a real and substantial connection with the territorial jurisdiction in which the order was made at the time the proceeding was commenced or the order was made.
In British Columbia, the courts must recognize an extraprovincial (but Canadian) declaratory parentage order, and upon recognition, the order has the same effect as if it were made under the BC FLA. The court can decline to recognize an extraprovincial declaratory order if new evidence is available or the court is satisfied that the extraprovincial declaratory order was obtained by fraud or duress. International declaratory orders must be recognized if at the time of the order the child or at least one of the child’s parents was resident in the foreign jurisdiction or had a real and substantial connection with the foreign jurisdiction. British Columbia courts may decline to recognize the international declaratory order if there is new evidence available, if the court is satisfied that the order was obtained by fraud or duress, or if the order is contrary to public policy. Ontario’s provisions are similar to British Columbia’s. The Uniform Act also contains similar provisions in sections 13 - 17.

The Manitoba Law Reform Commission recommended that Manitoba’s legislation be made consistent with sections 13 – 17 of the Uniform Act.

Saskatchewan’s current provisions do not include a public policy exception to the requirement to recognize international extraprovincial declaratory orders. The Uniform Law Conference of Canada explained their addition of a public policy exception for orders made outside Canada as follows:

[The exception] is intended as a safeguard to allow a court to refuse to recognize a foreign order that might go so far beyond the rules proposed in this Act as to be contrary to public policy in the enacting jurisdiction. One example might be where an order is granted that makes a person a parent who has no genetic or gestational relationship to the child, and there was no evidence of intent to parent prior to the child’s conception or birth.

**Birth Certificates Issued Outside of Canada**

It is possible that birth certificates may be issued to children born outside of Canada with individuals listed as their parents who may not be considered parents under Saskatchewan law. This issue may arise, for instance, if there are differences between the jurisdictions as to whether a genetic link with the child is required to establish parentage where a surrogate is used. Section 18 of the Uniform Act addresses this situation as follows:

18(1) The persons listed as the parents of a child on a birth certificate issued by a jurisdiction outside Canada who would not be presumed to be the parents of that child under this Act may apply to the court for a declaratory order that they are the parents of that child.
(2) The court may make an order sought under subsection (1) if the child would otherwise have no parents.

(3) The court may consider a birth certificate issued by a jurisdiction outside Canada as evidence for the purpose of making an order under this section.

The Manitoba Law Reform Commission recommended that such a provision be incorporated into Manitoba’s parentage laws.\(^{303}\)

**Children Born to Surrogates Outside of Saskatchewan**

Alberta’s *FLA* includes an additional specific jurisdiction provision for surrogacies: an Alberta court can only make a declaration of parentage in the case of surrogacy if the child is born in Alberta.\(^{304}\)

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**Consultation Questions**

23. *Should a “contrary to public policy” exception be added to s. 52 of the CLA, 1997? Why or why not?*

24. *Should declaratory orders be possible to recognize the parentage of individuals listed on a birth certificate issued outside of Canada in situations where those individuals would not be considered parents under Saskatchewan’s legislation? Why or why not?*

25. *Should there be any restrictions on the process (administrative or judicial) for transferring parentage in cases where surrogates are used based on the location of the child’s birth? Why or why not?*

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\(^{303}\) *Manitoba Report, supra* note 1 at 38.

\(^{304}\) *AB FLA, supra* note 52 at s. 8.2(11).
5. Consultation Questions

Guiding Principles

1. What guiding principles should the Commission consider when making its recommendations?

2. Should any guiding principle be of higher importance than the others?

Gamete and Embryo Donation

3. What presumptions of parentage should apply in cases of assisted reproduction using gamete and embryo donation?

4. Should the Act state that gamete and embryo donors are not parents solely on the basis of their donation?

5. Should the Act allow donors to opt into legal parenthood if certain conditions are met? If so, what conditions?

6. Should there be an intermediate status for known donors in order to ensure that donors that play a role in the child’s life are not subsequently treated as parents by the courts? What rights and responsibilities should attach to that status?

7. If so, under what circumstances should a donor be able to obtain this status?

8. Should the assisted reproduction parentage provisions apply to situations of assisted reproduction using sperm donation through sexual intercourse? Why or why not?

9. If so, should a pre-conception agreement be required in order for a sperm donor to not be determined to be a legal parent where sperm donation has occurred via sexual intercourse? Are there any other conditions that should be imposed on this arrangement?

Surrogacy

10. What presumptions of parentage should apply to a surrogacy?

11. Should there be different presumptions of parentage and procedures for traditional and gestational surrogacies? If so, how should the presumptions should differ?
12. Should the presumptions of parentage for a surrogacy apply to a surrogacy where neither intended parent has a genetic link to the child, or should that situation be subject to adoption procedures?

13. Should relinquishing/transferring parental status be possible prior to birth? Why or why not?

14. Should relinquishing/transferring of parental status be an administrative or judicial procedure?

15. What conditions or requirements should be imposed on a procedure to relinquish/transfer parental status?

16. Should surrogacy agreements, including provisions related to parentage, be enforceable? Should there be a distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacies? Why or why not?

17. If parentage related provisions in surrogacy agreements should not be enforceable, should other types of provisions in surrogacy agreements be enforceable? Should legislation specify which types of provisions are and are not enforceable? Why or why not?

18. Should there be conditions on whether the surrogacy agreement, or a certain type of provision the agreement, is enforceable? If so, what should those conditions be?

Multiple Parents

19. Should the legislation allow for more than two parents? Why or why not?

20. If the legislation allows for more than two parents, what requirements or conditions should be imposed?

Posthumous Conception

21. Should Saskatchewan’s legislation contain a provision dealing with posthumous conception and parentage? Why or why not?

22. If so, how should the parentage of children conceived posthumously be determined? What conditions should be attached?
Children Born Outside Saskatchewan

23. Should a “contrary to public policy” exception be added to s. 52 of the CLA, 1997? Why or why not?

24. Should declaratory orders be possible to recognize the parentage of individuals listed on a birth certificate issued outside of Canada in situations where those individuals would not be considered parents under Saskatchewan’s legislation? Why or why not?

25. Should there be any restrictions on the process (administrative or judicial) for transferring parentage in cases where surrogates are used based on the location of the child’s birth? Why or why not?
## Appendix: Assisted Reproduction & Parentage Comparison Chart

**Parental status of sperm donors**

*Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA) applies across Canada but who is considered a parent is governed by provincial legislation.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 at s 24(1): Donor not automatically parent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>24 (1) If a child is born as a result of assisted reproduction, a donor who provided human reproductive material or an embryo for the assisted reproduction of the child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) is not, by reason only of the donation, the child’s parent,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) may not be declared by a court, by reason only of the donation, to be the child’s parent, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) is the child’s parent only if determined, under this Part, to be the child’s parent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5 at ss 7(4) and 8.2(1): Rules of parentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (4) A person who donates human reproductive material or an embryo for use in assisted reproduction without the intention of using the material or embryo for his or her own reproductive use is not, by reason only of the donation, a parent of a child born as a result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>No legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>No legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C.12 at s 5: Provision of reproductive material, embryo not determinative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 A person who provides reproductive material or an embryo for use in the conception of a child through assisted reproduction is not, and shall not be recognized in law to be, a parent of the child unless he or she is a parent of the child under this Part.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>538.2. The contribution of genetic material to the parental project of another cannot be the basis for any bond of filiation between the contributor and the child consequently born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>However, if the contribution of genetic material is provided by way of sexual intercourse, a bond of filiation may be established, in the year following the birth, between the contributor and the child. During that period, the spouse of the woman who gave birth to the child may not invoke possession of status consistent with the act of birth in order to oppose the application for establishment of the filiation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>No legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Birth Registration Regulations, NS Reg 390/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assisted conception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (1) Despite Section 4 of the Act, if the mother of a child who was conceived as the result of assisted conception is married, the birth of the child must be registered showing the spouse of the mother as the child’s other parent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Despite Section 4 of the Act, if the mother of a child who was conceived as the result of assisted conception is unmarried and the person whom the child’s mother acknowledges as the child’s other parent files a statutory declaration with the Registrar or the division registrar acknowledging that that person intends to assume the role of parent of the child, the birth of the child must be registered showing that person as the child’s other parent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) If a request to register an assisted conception is made after the registration of the birth in accordance with Section 4 of the Act, the Registrar may amend the registration in accordance with the request by making the necessary notation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>Child Status Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-6 at s 9(6): Status of donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 (6) A person who donates the semen or ovum used in the assisted conception of a child is not, by that reason alone, a parent of the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland &amp; Labrador</td>
<td>Children’s Law Act, RSNL 1990, c C-13 at s 12: Artificial insemination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12 (1) In this section, “artificial insemination” includes the fertilization by a man’s semen of a woman’s ovum outside of her uterus and subsequent implantation of the fertilized ovum in her.

(2) A man whose semen was used to artificially inseminate a woman is in law the father of the resulting child if he was married to or cohabiting with the woman at the time she is inseminated even if his semen was mixed with the semen of another man.

(3) A man who is married to a woman at the time she is artificially inseminated solely with the semen of another man shall be considered in law to be the father of the resulting child if he consents in advance to the insemination.

(4) A man who is not married to a woman with whom he is cohabiting at the time she is artificially inseminated solely with the semen of another man shall be considered in law to be the father of the resulting child if he consents in advance to the insemination, unless it is proved that he refused to consent to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.

(5) Notwithstanding a married or cohabiting man’s failure to consent to the insemination or consent to assume the responsibilities of parenthood under subsection (3) or (4), he shall be considered in law to be the father of the resulting child if he has demonstrated a settled intention to treat the child as his child unless it is proved that he did not know that the child resulted from artificial insemination.

(6) A man whose semen is used to artificially inseminate a woman to whom he is not married or with whom he is not cohabiting at the time of the insemination is not in law the father of the resulting child.

Yukon  
No legislation

Northwest Territories  
*Children’s Law Act, SNWT 1997, c 14 at s 5.1(3):*

**Donor**

5.1 ... (3) A person who donates human reproductive material or an embryo for use in assisted reproduction is not, by reason only of the donation, a parent of a child born as a result and may not, by reason only the donation, be declared under this section to be a parent of the child.

Nunavut  
No legislation

### Parental status of surrogates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Columbia</th>
<th>Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 at s 29:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parentage if surrogacy arrangement</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **29** (1) In this section, “surrogate” means a birth mother who is a party to an agreement described in subsection (2).  
(2) This section applies if,  
(a) before a child is conceived through assisted reproduction, a written agreement is made between a potential surrogate and an intended parent or the intended parents, and  
(b) the agreement provides that the potential surrogate will be the birth mother of a child conceived through assisted reproduction and that, on the child’s birth,  
(i) the surrogate will not be a parent of the child,  
(ii) the surrogate will surrender the child to the intended parent or intended parents, and  
(iii) the intended parent or intended parents will be the child’s parent or parents.  
(3) On the birth of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction in the circumstances described in subsection (2), a person who is an intended parent under the agreement is the child’s parent if all of the following conditions are met:  
(a) before the child is conceived, no party to the agreement withdraws from the agreement;  
(b) after the child’s birth,  
(i) the surrogate gives written consent to surrender the child to an intended parent or the intended parents, and  
(ii) the intended parent or intended parents take the child into his or her, or their, care.  
(4) For the purposes of the consent required under subsection (3) (b) (i), the Supreme Court may waive the consent if the surrogate  
(a) is deceased or incapable of giving consent, or  
(b) cannot be located after reasonable efforts to locate her have been made.  
(5) If an intended parent dies, or the intended parents die, after the child is conceived, the deceased intended parent is, or intended parents are, the child’s parent or parents if the surrogate gives written consent to surrender the child to the personal representative or other person acting in the place of the deceased intended parent or intended parents.  
(6) An agreement under subsection (2) to act as a surrogate or to surrender a child is not consent for the purposes of subsection (3) (b) (i) or (5), but may be used as evidence of the parties’ intentions with respect to the child’s parentage if a dispute arises after the child’s birth.  
(7) Despite subsection (2) (a), the child’s parents are the deceased person and the intended parent if  
(a) the circumstances set out in section 28 (1) [parentage if assisted reproduction after death] apply,  
(b) before a child is conceived through assisted reproduction, a written agreement is made between a potential surrogate and a person who was married to, or in a marriage-like relationship, with the deceased person, and  
(c) subsections (2) (b) and (3) (a) and (b) apply. |
Genetic link is required to get a parental declaration. If the birth mother is a surrogate, then she is the legal mother of the child until she relinquishes her parentage by consenting to an application made under ss 8.2.

Rules of Parentage

7 ...

(5) A person who was married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a surrogate at the time of the child’s conception is not a parent of the child born as a result of the assisted reproduction.

Surrogacy

8.2(1) An application may be made to the court for a declaration that

(a) a surrogate is not a parent of a child born to the surrogate as a result of assisted reproduction, and
(b) a person whose human reproductive material or embryo was provided for use in the assisted reproduction is a parent of that child.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), the following persons may make an application under subsection (1):

(a) the surrogate;
(b) a person referred to in subsection (1)(b);
(c) a person who was, at the time of the child’s conception, married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a person referred to in subsection (1)(b).

(3) If a child is born as a result of assisted reproduction with the use of human reproductive material or an embryo provided by both a male person referred to in subsection (1)(b) and a female person referred to in subsection (1)(b), only the surrogate, the male person or the female person may make an application under subsection (1).

(4) An application under subsection (1) may not be commenced more than 30 days after the date of the child’s birth unless the court allows a longer period.

(5) Unless the court directs otherwise, the following persons must, in accordance with the regulations, be served with notice of the application:

(a) if a surrogate brings an application under subsection (1),
   (i) a person referred to in subsection (1)(b),
   (ii) unless subsection (3) applies, a person who was, at the time of the child’s conception, married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a person referred to in subsection (1)(b), and
   (iii) any other person as the court considers appropriate;
(b) if a person referred to in subsection (1)(b) brings an application under subsection (1),
   (i) the surrogate,
   (ii) unless subsection (3) applies, a person who was, at the time of the child’s conception, married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a person referred to in subsection (1)(b),
   (iii) if subsection (3) applies, the other person referred to in subsection (1)(b), and
   (iv) any other person as the court considers appropriate;
(c) if a person who was, at the time of the child’s conception, married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a person referred to in subsection (1)(b) brings an application,
   (i) the person referred to in subsection (1)(b),
   (ii) the surrogate, and
   (iii) any other person as the court considers appropriate.

(6) The court shall make the declaration applied for if the court is satisfied that

(a) the child was born as a result of assisted reproduction with the use of human reproductive material or an embryo provided by a person referred to in subsection (1)(b), and
(b) the surrogate consents, in the form provided for by the regulations, to the application.

(7) A person who is declared to be a parent of the child under subsection (6) and any person who, as a result of that declaration, is a parent of the child under section 8.1 are deemed to be the parents at and from the time of the birth of the child.

(8) Any agreement under which a surrogate agrees to give birth to a child for the purpose of relinquishing that child to a person

(a) is not enforceable,
(b) may not be used as evidence of consent of the surrogate under subsection (6)(b), and
(c) may be used as evidence of consent for the purposes of section 8.1(2)(b)(ii) or (3)(b)(ii).

(9) The court may waive the consent required under subsection (6)(b) if

(a) the surrogate is deceased, or
(b) the surrogate cannot be located after reasonable efforts have been made to locate her.

(10) If the court makes a declaration under subsection (6), the court shall identify in the declaration any person referred to in section 8.1(2)(b)(i) and (ii) or (3)(b)(i) and (ii), as the case may be, who is a parent as a result of that declaration.
The court has jurisdiction under this section if the child is born in Alberta.

An application may not be made under this section if
(a) the child has been adopted, or
(b) the declaration sought would result in the child having more than 2 parents.

Saskatchewan
No legislation

Manitoba
No legislation

Ontario

Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C.12

Birth parent
6 (1) The birth parent of a child is, and shall be recognized in law to be, a parent of the child. 2016, c. 23, s. 1 (1).

Exception, surrogacy
(2) Subsection (1) is subject to the relinquishment of an entitlement to parentage by a surrogate under section 10, or to a declaration by a court to that effect under section 10 or 11.

Surrogacy, up to four intended parents

Definitions
10 (1) In this section and in section 11,
“intended parent” means a party to a surrogacy agreement, other than the surrogate; (“parent d’intention”)
“surrogacy agreement” means a written agreement between a surrogate and one or more persons respecting a child to be carried by the surrogate, in which,
(a) the surrogate agrees to not be a parent of the child, and
(b) each of the other parties to the agreement agrees to be a parent of the child. (“convention de gestation pour autrui”)

Application
(2) This section applies only if the following conditions are met:
1. The surrogate and one or more persons enter into a surrogacy agreement before the child to be carried by the surrogate is conceived.
2. The surrogate and the intended parent or parents each received independent legal advice before entering into the agreement.
3. Of the parties to the agreement, there are no more than four intended parents.
4. The child is conceived through assisted reproduction.

Recognition of parentage
(3) Subject to subsection (4), on the surrogate providing to the intended parent or parents consent in writing relinquishing the surrogate’s entitlement to parentage of the child,
(a) the child becomes the child of each intended parent and each intended parent becomes, and shall be recognized in law to be, a parent of the child; and
(b) the child ceases to be the child of the surrogate and the surrogate ceases to be a parent of the child.

Limitation
(4) The consent referred to in subsection (3) must not be provided before the child is seven days old.

Parental rights and responsibilities
(5) Unless the surrogacy agreement provides otherwise, the surrogate and the intended parent or parents share the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the child from the time of the child’s birth until the child is seven days old, but any provision of the surrogacy agreement respecting parental rights and responsibilities after that period is of no effect.

Failure to give consent
(6) Any party to a surrogacy agreement may apply to the court for a declaration of parentage with respect to the child if the consent referred to in subsection (3) is not provided by the surrogate because,
(a) the surrogate is deceased or otherwise incapable of providing the consent;
(b) the surrogate cannot be located after reasonable efforts have been made to do so; or
(c) the surrogate refuses to provide the consent.

Declaration
(7) If an application is made under subsection (6), the court may,
(a) grant the declaration that is sought; or
(b) make any other declaration respecting the parentage of a child born to the surrogate as the court sees fit.

Child’s best interests
(8) The paramount consideration by the court in making a declaration under subsection (7) shall be the best interests of the child.

Effect of surrogacy agreement
(9) A surrogacy agreement is unenforceable in law, but may be used as evidence of,
(a) an intended parent’s intention to be a parent of a child contemplated by the agreement; and
**Surrogacy, more than four intended parents**

11 (1) If the conditions set out in subsection 10 (2) are met other than the condition set out in paragraph 3 of that subsection, any party to the surrogacy agreement may apply to the court for a declaration of parentage respecting a child contemplated by the agreement.

**Time limit**

2 (2) An application under subsection (1) may not be made,
(a) until the child is born; and
(b) unless the court orders otherwise, after the first anniversary of the child’s birth.

**Parental rights and responsibilities**

(3) Unless the surrogacy agreement provides otherwise, the surrogate and the intended parents share the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the child from the time of the child’s birth until the court makes a declaration of parentage respecting the child.

**Declaration**

(4) If an application is made under subsection (1), the court may make any declaration that the court may make under section 10 and, for the purpose, subsections 10 (8) and (9) apply with necessary modifications.

**Post-birth consent of surrogate**

(5) A declaration naming one or more intended parents as a parent of the child and determining that the surrogate is not a parent of the child shall not be made under subsection (4) unless, after the child’s birth, the surrogate provides to the intended parents consent in writing relinquishing the surrogate’s entitlement to parentage of the child.

**Waiver**

(6) Despite subsection (5), the court may waive the consent if any of the circumstances set out in subsection 10 (6) apply.

---

**Quebec**

Surrogacy agreements are null. Quebec requires a post-birth stepparent adoption to occur before the other parent can be recognized as a legal parent.

**Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991 541.** Any agreement whereby a woman undertakes to procreate or carry a child for another person is absolutely null.

**New Brunswick**

No legislation

**Nova Scotia**

Birth Registration Regulations, NS Reg 390/2007 at s 5(2):

**Surrogacy**

5 …

(2) On application by the intended parents in a surrogacy arrangement, the court may make a declaratory order with respect to the parentage of the child if all of the following apply:

(a) the surrogacy arrangement was initiated by the intended parents;
(b) the surrogacy arrangement was planned before conception;
(c) the woman who is to carry and give birth to the child does not intend to be the child’s parent;
(d) the intended parents intend to be the child’s parents;
(e) one of the intended parents has a genetic link to the child.

**Prince Edward Island**

Prince Edward Island requires a post-birth stepparent adoption to occur before the other parent can be recognized as a legal parent.

**Child Status Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-6 at s 9(7):**

9 …

**Birth mother**

(7) A woman who gives birth to a child is deemed to be the mother of the child, whether the woman is or is not the genetic mother of the child.

**Newfoundland & Labrador**

No legislation

**Yukon**

No legislation

**Northwest Territories**

No legislation

**Nunavut**

No legislation
### Restrictions on number of parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 at s 30: Parentage if other arrangement</td>
<td>Section 30 allows for up to five parents if there is a preconception agreement in place (two intended parents, a sperm donor, an egg donor, and the gestational carrier).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5 at s 9(7): Declaration respecting parentage</td>
<td>No more than two people can be declared parents of a child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Child can have up to four parents (per Vital Statistics Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation doesn’t prohibit more than two parents, but understanding is that Vital Stats will not register more than two parents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C.12 Parents under pre-conception parentage agreements</td>
<td>(1) In this section, “pre-conception parentage agreement” means a written agreement between two or more parties in which they agree to be, together, the parents of a child yet to be conceived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) This section applies with respect to a pre-conception parentage agreement only if,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) there are no more than four parties to the agreement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) the intended birth parent is not a surrogate, and is a party to the agreement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) if the child is to be conceived through sexual intercourse but not through insemination by a sperm donor, the person whose sperm is to be used for the purpose of conception is a party to the agreement; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) if the child is to be conceived through assisted reproduction or through insemination by a sperm donor, the spouse, if any, of the person who intends to be the birth parent is a party to the agreement, subject to subsection (3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If spouse intends to not be a parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Clause (2) (d) does not apply if, before the child is conceived, the birth parent’s spouse provides written confirmation that he or she does not consent to be a parent of the child and does not withdraw the confirmation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition of parentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) On the birth of a child contemplated by a pre-conception parentage agreement, together with every party to a pre-conception parentage agreement who is a parent of the child under section 6 (birth parent), 7 (other biological parent) or 8 (birth parent’s spouse), the other parties to the agreement are, and shall be recognized in law to be, parents of the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Declaration of parentage, general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) At any time after a child is born, any person having an interest may apply to the court for a declaration that a person is or is not a parent of the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exception, adopted child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the child is adopted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If the court finds on the balance of probabilities that a person is or is not a parent of a child, the court may make a declaration to that effect.

**Restriction**

(4) Despite subsection (3), the court shall not make any of the following declarations of parentage respecting a child under that subsection unless the conditions set out in subsection (5) are met:

1. A declaration of parentage that results in the child having more than two parents.
2. A declaration of parentage that results in the child having as a parent one other person, in addition to his or her birth parent, if that person is not a parent of the child under section 7, 8 or 9.

**Conditions**

(5) The following conditions apply for the purposes of subsection (4):

1. The application for the declaration is made on or before the first anniversary of the child’s birth, unless the court orders otherwise.
2. Every other person who is a parent of the child is a party to the application.
3. There is evidence that, before the child was conceived, every parent of the child and every person in respect of whom a declaration of parentage respecting that child is sought under the application intended to be, together, parents of the child.
4. The declaration is in the best interests of the child.

Quebec
No legislation.

New Brunswick
No express legislative provision on a child having more than two parents.

Nova Scotia
No legislation.

Prince Edward Island
*Child Status Act*, RSPEI 1988, c C-6 at s 9(8).

**Conflicting presumptions**

(8) The presumptions in this section shall not be applied if they result in more than one person being considered to be the parent of a child, in addition to the mother.

Newfoundland & Labrador
No express legislative provision on a child having more than two parents. Legislation does not contemplate more than two parents.

Yukon
No legislation.

Northwest Territories
No legislation.

Nunavut
No express legislative provision on a child having more than two parents.

**Requirements for genetic links to parents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>No genetic link is required between intended parents and child. No mention of genetic link in the definition of “intended parent”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>One of the intended parents must have a genetic link to the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>Likely one of the intended parents must have a genetic link to the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>No mention of genetic link requirement in legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>No requirement for genetic link.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>No mention of genetic link requirement in legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>One of the intended parents must have a genetic link to the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>One of the intended parents must have a genetic link to the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>Courts have only dealt with situations involving biological intended parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland &amp; Labrador</td>
<td>Likely need two parents to be genetically related to the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>Likely need two parents to be genetically related to the child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
<td><em>Children’s Law Act</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does not require genetic link between either birth mother/child or other parent/child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunavut</td>
<td>Likely need two parents to be genetically related to the child.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Role and affect of donor/surrogacy written agreements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td><em>Family Law Act</em>, SBC 2011, c 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parentage if surrogacy arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 (1) In this section, “surrogate” means a birth mother who is a party to an agreement described in subsection (2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) This section applies if,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) before a child is conceived through assisted reproduction, a written agreement is made between a potential surrogate and an intended parent or the intended parents, and
(b) the agreement provides that the potential surrogate will be the birth mother of a child conceived through assisted reproduction and that, on the child’s birth,
   (i) the surrogate will not be a parent of the child,
   (ii) the surrogate will surrender the child to the intended parent or intended parents, and
   (iii) the intended parent or intended parents will be the child’s parent or parents.

(3) On the birth of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction in the circumstances described in subsection (2), a person who is an intended parent under the agreement is the child’s parent if all of the following conditions are met:
   (a) before the child is conceived, no party to the agreement withdraws from the agreement;
   (b) after the child’s birth,
      (i) the surrogate gives written consent to surrender the child to an intended parent or the intended parents, and
      (ii) an intended parent or the intended parents take the child into his or her, or their, care.

(4) For the purposes of the consent required under subsection (3) (b) (i), the Supreme Court may waive the consent if the surrogate
   (a) is deceased or incapable of giving consent, or
   (b) cannot be located after reasonable efforts to locate her have been made.

(5) If an intended parent dies, or the intended parents die, after the child is conceived, the deceased intended parent is, or intended parents are, the child’s parent or parents if the surrogate gives written consent to surrender the child to the personal representative or other person acting in the place of the deceased intended parent or intended parents.

(6) An agreement under subsection (2) to act as a surrogate or to surrender a child is not consent for the purposes of subsection (3) (b) (i) or (5), but may be used as evidence of the parties’ intentions with respect to the child’s parentage if a dispute arises after the child’s birth.

(7) Despite subsection (2) (a), the child’s parents are the deceased person and the intended parent if
   (a) the circumstances set out in section 28 (1) [parentage if assisted reproduction after death] apply,
   (b) before a child is conceived through assisted reproduction, a written agreement is made between a potential surrogate and a person who was married to or in a marriage-like relationship with the potential birth mother and a donor who agrees to be a parent together with the potential birth mother and a person married to or in a marriage-like relationship with the potential birth mother, and
   (c) subsections (2) (b) and (3) (a) and (b) apply.

Parentage if other arrangement
30 (1) This section applies if there is a written agreement that
   (a) is made before a child is conceived through assisted reproduction,
   (b) is made between
      (i) an intended parent or the intended parents and a potential birth mother who agrees to be a parent together with the intended parent or intended parents, or
      (ii) the potential birth mother, a person who is married to or in a marriage-like relationship with the potential birth mother, and a donor who agrees to be a parent together with the potential birth mother and a person married to or in a marriage-like relationship with the potential birth mother, and
   (c) provides that
      (i) the potential birth mother will be the birth mother of a child conceived through assisted reproduction, and
      (ii) on the child’s birth, the parties to the agreement will be the parents of the child.

(2) On the birth of a child born as a result of assisted reproduction in the circumstances described in subsection (1), the child’s parents are the parties to the agreement.

(3) If an agreement described in subsection (1) is made but, before a child is conceived, a party withdraws from the agreement or dies, the agreement is deemed to be revoked.
(3) If a child is born as a result of assisted reproduction with the use of human reproductive material or an embryo provided by both a male person referred to in subsection (1)(b) and a female person referred to in subsection (1)(b), only the surrogate, the male person or the female person may make an application under subsection (1).

(4) An application under subsection (1) may not be commenced more than 30 days after the date of the child’s birth unless the court allows a longer period.

(5) Unless the court directs otherwise, the following persons must, in accordance with the regulations, be served with notice of the application:

| (a) if a surrogate brings an application under subsection (1), |
| (i) a person referred to in subsection (1)(b), |
| (ii) unless subsection (3) applies, a person who was, at the time of the child’s conception, married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a person referred to in subsection (1)(b), and |
| (iii) any other person as the court considers appropriate; |
| (b) if a person referred to in subsection (1)(b) brings an application under subsection (1), |
| (i) the surrogate, |
| (ii) unless subsection (3) applies, a person who was, at the time of the child’s conception, married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a person referred to in subsection (1)(b), |
| (iii) if subsection (3) applies, the other person referred to in subsection (1)(b), and |
| (iv) any other person as the court considers appropriate; |
| (c) if a person who was, at the time of the child’s conception, married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a person referred to in subsection (1)(b) brings an application, |
| (i) the person referred to in subsection (1)(b), |
| (ii) the surrogate, and |
| (iii) any other person as the court considers appropriate. |

(6) The court shall make the declaration applied for if the court is satisfied that

| (a) the child was born as a result of assisted reproduction with the use of human reproductive material or an embryo provided by a person referred to in subsection (1)(b), and |
| (b) the surrogate consents, in the form provided for by the regulations, to the application. |

(7) A person who is declared to be a parent of the child under subsection (6) and any person who, as a result of that declaration, is a parent of the child under section 8.1 are deemed to be the parents at and from the time of the birth of the child.

(8) Any agreement under which a surrogate agrees to give birth to a child for the purpose of relinquishing that child to a person

| (a) is not enforceable, |
| (b) may not be used as evidence of consent of the surrogate under subsection (6)(b), and |
| (c) may be used as evidence of consent for the purposes of section 8.1(2)(b)(ii) or (3)(b)(ii). |

(9) The court may waive the consent required under subsection (6)(b) if

| (a) the surrogate is deceased, or |
| (b) the surrogate cannot be located after reasonable efforts have been made to locate her. |

(10) If the court makes a declaration under subsection (6), the court shall identify in the declaration any person referred to in section 8.1(2)(b)(i) and (ii) or (3)(b)(i) and (ii), as the case may be, who is a parent as a result of that declaration.

(11) The court has jurisdiction under this section if the child is born in Alberta.

(12) An application may not be made under this section if

| (a) the child has been adopted, or |
| (b) the declaration sought would result in the child having more than 2 parents. |

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**Saskatchewan**

No mention of surrogacy in legislation.

**Manitoba**

No mention of surrogacy in legislation.

**Ontario**

**Surrogacy, up to four intended parents**

**Definitions**

10 (1) In this section and in section 11, “intended parent” means a party to a surrogacy agreement, other than the surrogate; (“parent d’intention”)

“surrogacy agreement” means a written agreement between a surrogate and one or more persons respecting a child to be carried by the surrogate, in which,

| (a) the surrogate agrees to not be a parent of the child, and |
| (b) each of the other parties to the agreement agrees to be a parent of the child. (“convention de gestation pour autrui”) |

**Application**

(2) This section applies only if the following conditions are met:
1. The surrogate and one or more persons enter into a surrogacy agreement before the child to be carried by the surrogate is conceived.
2. The surrogate and the intended parent or parents each received independent legal advice before entering into the agreement.
3. Of the parties to the agreement, there are no more than four intended parents.
4. The child is conceived through assisted reproduction.

Recognition of parentage
(3) Subject to subsection (4), on the surrogate providing to the intended parent or parents consent in writing relinquishing the surrogate’s entitlement to parentage of the child,
   (a) the child becomes the child of each intended parent and each intended parent becomes, and shall be recognized in law to be, a parent of the child; and
   (b) the child ceases to be the child of the surrogate and the surrogate ceases to be a parent of the child.

Limitation
(4) The consent referred to in subsection (3) must not be provided before the child is seven days old.

Parental rights and responsibilities
(5) Unless the surrogacy agreement provides otherwise, the surrogate and the intended parent or parents share the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the child from the time of the child’s birth until the child is seven days old, but any provision of the surrogacy agreement respecting parental rights and responsibilities after that period is of no effect.

Failure to give consent
(6) Any party to a surrogacy agreement may apply to the court for a declaration of parentage with respect to the child if the consent referred to in subsection (3) is not provided by the surrogate because,
   (a) the surrogate is deceased or otherwise incapable of providing the consent;
   (b) the surrogate cannot be located after reasonable efforts have been made to do so; or
   (c) the surrogate refuses to provide the consent.

Declaration
(7) If an application is made under subsection (6), the court may,
   (a) grant the declaration that is sought; or
   (b) make any other declaration respecting the parentage of a child born to the surrogate as the court sees fit.

Child’s best interests
(8) The paramount consideration by the court in making a declaration under subsection (7) shall be the best interests of the child.

Effect of surrogacy agreement
(9) A surrogacy agreement is unenforceable in law, but may be used as evidence of,
   (a) an intended parent’s intention to be a parent of a child contemplated by the agreement; and
   (b) a surrogate’s intention to not be a parent of a child contemplated by the agreement.

Surrogacy, more than four intended parents
11 (1) If the conditions set out in subsection 10 (2) are met other than the condition set out in paragraph 3 of that subsection, any party to the surrogacy agreement may apply to the court for a declaration of parentage respecting a child contemplated by the agreement.

Time limit
(2) An application under subsection (1) may not be made,
   (a) until the child is born; and
   (b) unless the court orders otherwise, after the first anniversary of the child’s birth.

Parental rights and responsibilities
(3) Unless the surrogacy agreement provides otherwise, the surrogate and the intended parents share the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the child from the time of the child’s birth until the court makes a declaration of parentage respecting the child.

Declaration
(4) If an application is made under subsection (1), the court may make any declaration that the court may make under subsection 10 and, for the purpose, subsections 10 (8) and (9) apply with necessary modifications.

Post-birth consent of surrogate
(5) A declaration naming one or more intended parents as a parent of the child and determining that the surrogate is not a parent of the child shall not be made under subsection (4) unless, after the child’s birth, the surrogate provides to the intended parents consent in writing relinquishing the surrogate’s entitlement to parentage of the child.

Waiver
(6) Despite subsection (5), the court may waive the consent if any of the circumstances set out in subsection 10 (6) apply.

Quebec
Preconception agreements are legally unenforceable
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>No mention of surrogacy in legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Birth Registration Regulations, NS Reg 390/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Surrogacy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S (1) In this Section, “court” means the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia (Family Division) or the Family Court of Nova Scotia as the case may be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) On application by the intended parents in a surrogacy arrangement, the court may make a declaratory order with respect to the parentage of the child if all of the following apply:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) the surrogacy arrangement was initiated by the intended parents;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) the surrogacy arrangement was planned before conception;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) the woman who is to carry and give birth to the child does not intend to be the child’s parent;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) the intended parents intend to be the child’s parents;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e) one of the intended parents has a genetic link to the child.</td>
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<td>(3) If the court makes a declaratory order under subsection (2), the court may order that</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(a) the name and particulars of the parents be registered and the name and particulars of a surrogate mother be removed; and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) the surname of the child be registered in accordance with the surname chosen by the intended parents.</td>
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<td>(4) An order made under subsection (3) must contain all of the following:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(a) the full names of the parents of the child;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) the date and place of the birth of the parents of the child;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(c) sufficient particulars of the birth of the child to identify the birth record that is to be changed.</td>
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<td>(5) On receipt of an order made under subsection (3), the Registrar must amend the child’s birth registration as required by the order.</td>
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<td>(6) If a child’s birth registration is amended in accordance with subsection (5), every birth certificate subsequently issued for the child must reflect the amended birth registration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>No mention of surrogacy in legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland &amp; Labrador</td>
<td>Vital Statistics Act, 2009, SNL 2009, c V-6.01</td>
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<td>(6) Where a child has been born through a surrogacy arrangement, the registrar general shall register the intended parents as the parents of that child where</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(a) an adoption order has been issued by the court under section 35 of the Adoption Act, 2013; or</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) a declaratory order respecting the parentage of the child has been issued under section 6 or 7 of the Children’s Law Act,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and a certified copy of that order has been received by the registrar general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>No mention of surrogacy in legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
<td>No mention of surrogacy in legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunavut</td>
<td>No mention of surrogacy in legislation.</td>
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</tbody>
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